City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

10-2014

Reconstructing the Nation: African American Political Thought
and America's Struggle for Racial Justice
Alex Zamalin
Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/399
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

RECONSTRUCTING THE NATION: AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
by
ALEKSANDR ZAMALIN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York
2014

© 2014
ALEKSANDR ZAMALIN
All Rights Reserved

ii

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Uday Singh Mehta

Date

Chair of Examining Committee
Alyson Cole

Date

Executive Officer

Uday Singh Mehta
Rosalind Petchesky
Linda Martin Alcoff
Supervisory Committee
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

Abstract
RECONSTRUCING THE NATION: AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
by
ALEKSANDR ZAMALIN
Adviser: Professor Uday Singh Mehta
This dissertation examines how twentieth-century African American intellectuals engaged
American political cultural beliefs central to American identity. A prominent argument of
American political thinkers has been that the liberal-democratic ideals of freedom, equality,
representative government, the rule of law, tolerance and civic obligation are what make
Americans a unique people. From the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to the late
twentieth-century such an argument provided American politicians, social movements and
intellectuals a strong justification for divergent political claims, from Cold War warriors calling
for the containment of Soviet Communism, to Civil Rights activists calling for racial integration
to neoconservatives calling for the dismantlement of the social welfare state. This dissertation
studies how one group of African American intellectuals writing in this period, James Baldwin,
Ralph Ellison and Toni Morrison, sought to provide counter-cultural narratives to dominant
American understandings of freedom, democracy and generosity. I examine these revisions to
shed light on each thinker's theoretical contributions, our understanding of the politics and art of
African American intellectuals and the canon of political thought itself.
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Chapter 1:
Reconstructing the Nation
This dissertation examines how twentieth-century African American intellectuals engaged
American political cultural beliefs central to American identity. A prominent argument of
American political thinkers has been that the liberal-democratic ideals of freedom, equality,
representative government, the rule of law, tolerance and civic obligation are what make
Americans a unique people. From the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to the late
twentieth-century such an argument provided American politicians, social movements and
intellectuals a strong justification for divergent political claims, from Cold War warriors calling
for the containment of Soviet Communism, to Civil Rights activists calling for racial integration
to neoconservatives calling for the dismantlement of the social welfare state. This dissertation
studies how one group of African American intellectuals writing in this period, James Baldwin,
Ralph Ellison and Toni Morrison, sought to provide counter-cultural narratives to dominant
American understandings of freedom, democracy and generosity. I examine these revisions to
shed light on each thinker's theoretical contributions, our understanding of the politics and art of
African American intellectuals and the canon of political thought itself.
The extensive body of literature studying the fiction, critical essays and speeches of
Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison has overlooked this aspect of their work. One reason might have
to do with scholars' concern with their aesthetics or relationship to literary traditions like
romanticism, modernism or postmodernism.1 After all, each thinker was an artist rather than
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For examples of such work on Baldwin see, Therman B. O'Daniel ed., James Baldwin: A Critical Evaluation
(Washington, D.C., Howard University Press, 1977); Magdalena Zaborowska, James Baldwin's Turkish Decade:
Erotics of Exile (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); Nancy V. Burt and Fred L. Standley ed., Critical Essays
on James Baldwin (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1988); For Ellison see, Robert G. O'Meally, The Craft of Ralph Ellison

statesman, a writer rather than scholar or explicit theorist of politics. Another reason might have
to do with scholars' preoccupation with how they theorized American cultural identity. Indeed, as
creators and theorists of American culture, each had much to say about whether it was simply
white Protestant, immigrant, black or hybrid; whether its cultural values were industriousness,
frugality and chastity or also saturated with a tragic-comic ethos that saw pain and suffering as
constitutive even if possible to overcome.2 Still another might have to do with fact that much of
the study of their political thought has centered on what each said about civil rights, strategy,
black politics, race or the canonical political-theoretical ideas of citizenship, the role of the state,
justice, power and rights.3 Yet all of these accounts overlook how each thinker engaged what
Alexis De Tocqueville's classic nineteenth century text, Democracy in America (1835/1840),
argued was the set of liberal-democratic ideals that appeared both natural and incontestable to
Americans. Tocqueville understood that values like freedom, equality, representative
government, the rule of law, tolerance, private property and civic obligation were central to
American culture.4 They not only shaped shaped voting patterns, public opinion, political
mobilization, protest or political partisanship but everything from the content of American

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Alan Nadel, Invisible Criticism: Ralph Ellison and the American
Canon (Iowa City: University Of Iowa Press, 1991); for Morrison see, Valerie Smith, Toni Morrison: Writing the
Moral Imagination (London: Wiley Blackwell, 2012); Yvette Christiansë, Toni Morrison: An Ethical Poetics (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2013)
2
For this in Baldwin and Ellison see, Ross Posnock Color and Culture: Black Writers and the the Making of the
Modern Intellectual (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); For Morrison, see Marcel Pope, Narrative
Innovation and Cultural Rewriting in the Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
3
For Baldwin see, Lawrie Balfour, Evidence of Things Not Said: James Baldwin and the Promise of Democracy
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); George M. Shulman, American Prophecy: Race and Redemption in
American Political Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Stephen H. Marshall, The City on
the Hill From Below: The Crisis of Prophetic Black Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011); for
Ellison see, Jack Turner, Awakening to Race: Individualism and Social Consciousness in America (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press); Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship after Brown V.
Board of Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). For Morrison, see Shulman, American
Prophecy.
4
Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
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literature, everyday communication, political judgment, self-knowledge, sense of political
possibility and responsibility.5
The first core argument this dissertation makes is that what I call political “countercultural narratives” were central to Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's work. Counter-cultural
narratives provide critiques or revisions of extant beliefs and modes of being. Dominant cultural
beliefs are not the only acceptable beliefs in a given epoch, but are seen by both ordinary citizens
and elites as generally correct or uncontroversial. Such beliefs are historically contingent but
often variations on larger, transhistorical ideas; specific to a nation or with international
resonance; narrowly about aesthetics or also about politics; expressed through political discourse,
public opinion, influential public intellectuals or art. Counter-cultural narratives are political
precisely because they seek to contest these dominant beliefs. By political, I mean something that
exceeds the narrow practice connected to the institutions of government, the mechanisms of
political representation, voting and social movements. Politics can exist through any contestation
of power, truth and meaning outside state-sanctioned discourses or the public sphere. In this
sense, counter-cultural narratives are political not because they articulate a specific policy
proposal or political strategy. At the same time, they are not simply political because they reflect
an author's subjective decision to advance a truth, which itself reflects a form of power. They are
political because they challenge and provide alternative understandings of prevailing political
values. They are political whether or not the revision is successful at promoting political
mobilization. Understanding this makes clear that fiction and creative nonfiction, rather than
direct political analysis, can itself become a form of engaged political critique and valueconstruction.
5

Almond and Verba famously define political culture as “the specifically political orientations attitudes towards the
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.” Gabriel Abraham
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 12.
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The specific counter-cultural narratives each thinker advanced are the following:
Baldwin’s essays in the 1950s through the late 1960s revised the idea that freedom is a core
commitment of American society, an idea affirmed by thinkers as diverse as Alexis De
Tocqueville, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Martin Luther King., Jr. Baldwin's revision of this idea
took placed at a moment when it was being popularized by liberal consensus historians like
Daniel Boorstin and Richard Hofstadter and political scientists like Louis Hartz and was being
embraced by the Civil Rights movement to call for African American desegregation, formal legal
equality and political enfranchisement. Baldwin's essays instead showed that American freedom
was constitutively compromised by hidden, everyday and inescapable psychological and social
vulnerability. Ellison's novel Invisible Man (1952) and his later essays revised the idea that
commitment to democracy was not constitutively marked by tragic, or unintended, difficult to
digest and sometimes harmful, consequences. This belief was assumed by thinkers like Frederick
Douglass, Walt Whitman, John Dewey, Gunnar Myrdal, Robert Dahl and Sheldon Wolin.
Ellison's revision took place at a moment, from the postwar period of racial segregation to the
white-ethnic and Afrocentric backlash against racial integration of the late 1970s through the
1990s, when the idea of democracy was being neglected or defined in ways that supported the
racially unequal status quo. During this period, Ellison's work revised democratic commitment as
that which would always unleash debilitating effects for citizens’ ability to be autonomous and
equal and would require burdensome vigilance and resilience from them. Morrison’s Beloved
(1987) revised the understanding of generosity as requiring a conditional adherence to normative
moral standards. This belief was espoused by Puritans like John Winthrop and individualists like
Benjamin Franklin and was put into practice through the various social welfare programs of early
twentieth century Progressivism. Beloved's revision took place when libertarians like Charles
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Murray, social conservatives like Thomas Sowell and public policy experts like Lawrence Mead
used it to justify President Ronald Reagan’s dismantling of the American social welfare state.
Beloved instead revised the understanding of generosity as unconditional, having no expiration
date and assuming recipients' agency.
The second core argument this dissertation makes is that Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison
demonstrated that accepting such counter-cultural narratives would be serviceable for racial
justice. Racial injustice is a distinct form of injustice predicated as much on the fact of blackwhite inequality in terms of wealth, job-access, housing, education and healthcare as on the
various myths, perceptions, attitudes and habits engendered by racial identity. Racial myths that
blacks are lazier, more criminal, more sexually devious, less responsible and less concerned with
education than whites have always structured white Americans' outlook on black citizens. They
have been crucially responsible for promoting in many white Americans less identification with,
compassion for and willingness to act in ways to address African American socioeconomic
marginalization. They have made it increasingly difficult to have more trustful interracial
communication and dialogue unconstrained by white assumptions of racial superiority. They
have created pain and anger in many African Americans. Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison
demonstrated that accepting their narratives could help undermine these perceptions and
practices because it would highlight two interrelated things. First, was the inescapability of
human vulnerability, the idea that the permanence of pain, suffering, lack of control over their
destiny was something that all Americans would inevitably experience at some point in their
lives. It was an idea, in other words, that could help mitigate assumptions of inequality,
superiority, difference and distance between citizens and compel them to see one another as
similar. Second, was the view that genuine giving needed to be unconditional, based in critical
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respect, compassion, solidarity and concern with others’ flourishing. This was the idea that a real
commitment to giving to others entailed deference to the act rather than self-interest, that it often
required self-sacrifice and ongoing effort even if it was unwise or impractical. In other words, it
aimed to help citizens see that ethical action towards vulnerable others in their community was
defined by a lack of expiration date, would need to be ongoing and would inevitably be
personally risky for those who enacted it.
Reconstructing the Nation and African American Thought
Attending to this aspect of Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's work challenges the prevailing
argument that, with the exception of black liberals, communists and nationalists associated with
the direct political struggle of the Civil Rights movement from the 1950s through the early
1970s, twentieth century African American intellectuals have largely failed to critique racial
injustice.6 Jerry Watts has famously claimed that the embrace of a “victim status” frame whose
purpose is to secure recognition of black victimhood from whites explains this failure. For Watts,
the victim-status frame endowed greater moral authority to writers like Ellison, Baldwin and
Amiri Baraka but in so doing eliminated any oppositional political discourse in their work.7 Yet
the victim status frame cannot explain Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's counter- cultural
narratives of the self, agency, community, equality, representation, individuality and ethics.
Examining this, I not only show how African American intellectuals provided an oppositional
discourse but how this discourse was not entirely constrained by the demand for white
recognition. One of Watts' corollary arguments is that the oppressed group's need for recognition
from the oppressors central to the victim-status frame forced African American intellectuals to
6

See Adolph L. Reed, Stirrings in the Jug: Black Politics in the Post-Segregation Era (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1999); Houston A. Baker, Betrayal: How Black Intellectuals Have Abandoned the Ideals of the
Civil Rights Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
7
Jerry Gafio Watts, Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black Intellectual (New York: New York University
Press, 2001), 11.
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speak in a language that would resonate with the dominant white culture. Not only did Baldwin's,
Ellison and Morrison's culturally transgressive account of freedom as compromised, equality as
shared suffering, democracy as tragic, generosity as unconditional, love as personal, direct and
social rather than purely civic, action as based in vigilance, resilience and sacrifice itself subvert
mainstream white cultural understandings. Each also captured how victimhood was inescapable
across racial lines rather than something over which blacks held a moral and empirical
monopoly. This point was captured most clearly by Morrison when she described her own work
as demonstrating how “[e]ach one of us is in some way at some moment a victim and in no
position to do a thing about it.”8
To highlight my disagreement with Watts, however, is not to argue that his interpretation
is entirely wrong or devoid of analytical value. In fact, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison can be
justifiably criticized for romanticizing black victimhood, implying that suffering was redemptive
and casting victimhood as endowing blacks greater moral authority than their white victimizers.
Yet, unlike Watts, what I show is that African American intellectual life was governed by a deep
and irresolvable tension between the need to communicate the real and unequal experience of
black victimization and to reformulate Americans' political understandings. On the one hand, we
see the need to legitimize and illustrate to a wider white audience the political, social and cultural
impact of slavery upon generations of African Americans. On the other hand, these writers
attempt to revise dominant political cultural understandings that preserved distance between
whites and blacks and encouraged disrespect and apathy. Whereas the former may have led these
intellectuals to unwittingly re-inscribe the discourse of black victimhood, the latter actually
sought to provide understandings that would eradicate the status quo of African American

8

Toni Morrison and Danielle Kathleen Taylor-Guthrie, Conversations with Toni Morrison (Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi, 1994), 40.
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victimhood in the form of socioeconomic marginalization. Yet throughout this project, I also
show how African American intellectuals' counter-cultural narratives were themselves victim to
deeply problematic shortcomings, over-sights and simplifications. Baldwin's dramatization of
vulnerability was evident in his own avoidance of and insensitivity to intersectional gendered
experience; the sophistication with which he probed psychic life did not extend to an account of
black women's vulnerability at the hands of black and white men. For all of Ellison's attempts to
show how democratic idealism created the conditions for its own undoing, he could not see that
his wish to speak about the human condition across the color line implicitly assumed the
perspective of men, did not acknowledge important class differences and was suffused with an
unbridled patriotic defense of America. No matter how attentive she was to the way victimhood
was constitutive of ethics, love and responsibility, Morrison herself could not avoid painting a
picture of black life as so painful, oppressive and constrained that hope, agency and resistance
seemed unlikely, if even possible.
Beyond reframing our understanding of African American intellectual life,
Reconstructing the Nation attempts to deepen our understanding of African American political
thought. What made Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison unique as political thinkers was their refusal
to narrowly examine racial justice from the perspective of what has long been a preoccupation of
African American political thought: black political strategy. At the turn of the twentieth century,
this debate centered on social acculturation against political agitation. Booker T. Washington
argued that black strategy needed to be decidedly anti-political, focusing instead on acculturation
into white society, economic gain and self-reliance.9 W. E. B. Du Bois famously challenged
Washington’s idealistic faith in uplift, disregard for the formative power of race and conviction
in progress. Du Bois' primary contention was that political agitation was necessary because
9

See Booker T. Washington, The Booker T. Washington Papers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972).
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racism and white supremacy powerfully allocated political, social and economic resources to
whites and denied them to blacks.10 By the postwar period, Du Bois’ argument became
dominant. But the core question concerning black political agitation now centered on a debate
between racial integration and black separatism. Echoing an earlier strain of Frederick Douglass’
patriotic liberalism, Martin Luther King, Jr. contended that black politics required non-violent
direct action centered on promoting racial integration.11 Malcolm X, echoing 19th century black
nationalists like David Walker, suggested that the white violence and intimidation and racial
socioeconomic disparity required a form of amoral political realism best advanced through
separate black social, economic and cultural institutions.12 Unlike this tradition, Baldwin’s,
Ellison’s and Morrison’s work did not offer political platforms, direct political ideologies or
identifiable programs of political action. Furthermore, these three writers did not advocate
specific public policies, whether colorblind or race-conscious, centered on socioeconomic
redistribution or equal opportunity. Yet perhaps their biggest difference came from their
demonstration that justice began in pre-political settings: everything from one's self-perceptions,
strategies of communication with others, individual judgment and understanding of action. This
perspective differed from John Rawls' famous argument that justice should be determined
through an abstract thought experiment behind a “veil of ignorance” about the kind of society
they would want to inhabit if they had no knowledge of their class, racial or gendered identity.13
It also differed from contemporary critical theorists’ arguments that determinations about justice
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See W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Martin Luther King and James Melvin Washington, A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin
Luther King, Jr. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986).
12
Manning Marable, Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention (London: Penguin Books, 2012); Robert Terrill, The
Cambridge companion to Malcolm X (New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
13
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). For a survey of Rawls’
impact on political philosophy see Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian
Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). For a sympathetic feminist critique, see Susan
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basics Books, 1991).
11
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require sensitivity to culturally different experiences of oppression.14 Baldwin, Ellison and
Morrison instead showed that racial justice required not recognition of individual sovereignty but
a deeper awareness of one's proclivity to err, one's irreconcilable contradictions and human
interdependence. Each showed that it depend upon a willingness to respond to others' suffering
in ways not governed by self-interest, personal gain or through means-ends logic. Each showed
that it depended upon accepting rather than jettisoning the constitutively negative outcomes of
responsible action, of risking one's security for the sake of others flourishing.
In doing this each also departed from what has been a longstanding strategy of African
American political thinkers concerned with fostering racial integration, reform and
reconciliation: the appeal to dominant understandings of American political culture. For
example, in “What to a Slave is the Fourth of July?” (1852) Frederick Douglass famously argued
that the transcendental, saving principles of freedom and equality found in The Declaration of
Independence and American Revolution, though denied slaves, themselves created the moral
justification for abolishing slavery.15 W.E.B. Du Bois' early work, Souls of Black Folk (1903),
provided a vivid description of black conditions under Jim Crow to dramatize the emotional,
physical and economic chasm created not only by the color line but also between American
political cultural ideals and practice. For Du Bois, making good on these ideals required
eliminating the gap created by the blinding veil of race.16 In what was arguably the apogee of the
historic black freedom struggle, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous “I Have a Dream” (1963)
speech argued that the ideals of the Declaration created a “promissory note to which every

14

See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) and
Anne Philips, The Politics of Presence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
15
Frederick Douglass, “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” in Frederick Douglass: Selected Writings and
Speeches, ed. Philip S. Foner and Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2000), 188-206.
16
Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have A Dream,” in A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of
Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James M. Washington (San Franscisco: Harper Collins, 1986), 217-221.
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American was to fall heir.”17 Understanding that American political culture was compromised of
the belief that all citizens were entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit happiness meant that blacks
could no longer be treated as second-class citizens, subject to violence, intimidation, crippling
poverty and political disenfranchisement. Douglass, Du Bois and King all accepted American
political culture's liberal-democratic core; each understood that engaging these beliefs was
politically valuable; each understood racial justice as depending not simply on abstract
arguments about fairness, reciprocity or consistency but on an engagement with beliefs that had
emotional, historical and collective resonance.
Like Douglass, Du Bois and King, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison explicitly argued for or
dramatized the importance of racial integration rather than separatism, reform rather than
revolutionary political and economic transformation and engagement with American values. Yet
unlike them, each showed that such change depended on a radical revision to America's liberal
democratic values. I use the term radical intentionally because it connotes a “to the root” critique
of extant paradigms and calls for a new, radical transformation founded on alternate principles.
Radicalism seeks to upend convention, transform the meaning of common sense and remake the
meaning of practicability. Radicalism's articulation of the impossible itself transforms the
meaning of the possible. American radicals, including abolitionists, anarchists, communists,
progressives and feminists, have always offered trenchant critiques of American capitalism,
social hierarchy, forms of government and the role of the state. African American radicals did
this but centered race. For them, race not only precluded radical political transformation, but a
transformation in racial thinking and structures was necessary for the creation of a new political
order, demonstrating that life without racialized capitalism,18 sexism19 and homophobia20 was

17
18

W.E.B. Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Cedric Robinson has contended that thinkers like W.E.B Du Bois and Richard Wright mobilized yet complicated
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possible. But others provided an entirely different vocabulary upon which national
understandings of identity, community, communication, action, judgment and ethics rested.
Anthony Bogues’ excellent work, Black Heretics, Black Prophets, studied this mode of
radicalism, examining a black heretic tradition that broke with the Western episteme to offer a
constructive vision for change alongside a black redemptive tradition that identified social
division, called for social healing and was prophetic.21 Baldwin’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s work
exemplified some of the historical revisionism central to the black heretic tradition along with
the truth-telling of the prophetic tradition, which, as George Shulman astutely notes, has been a
powerful form of claim-making in American political thought that announced truths to an
audience invested in denying them.22
Yet Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's work also revised core understandings embedded
in the American episteme. By episteme, I follow Michel Foucault who defined it as the system of
knowledge that itself forms the conditions of what kind of truth is intelligible, meaningful,
privileged or marginalized in a given society or historical moment.23 Epistemes create the
conditions for what ideas are dominant in a given culture, but the ideas that constitute epistemes
are much more foundational. The ideas of the American episteme each engaged were equality,

Marxist arguments about capitalist oppression to critique colonialism and call for class-conscious anti-colonial
resistance. See Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
19
Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New
York: Routledge, 1990).
20
Roderick Ferguson has identified how thinkers like Baldwin, Wright, Morrison and Ellison exposed and
challenged sociologists’ of race relations’ argument that black progress depended on hetero-normative,
patriarchic families. See Roderick A. Ferguson, Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
21
Anthony Bogues, Black heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals (New York: Routledge, 2003),
13, 15.
22
George M. Shulman, American Prophecy: Race and Redemption in American Political Culture (Minneapolis:
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individualism and the narrative genre through which to understand American life. First, each
sought to reframe prevailing American understandings of equality, which have generally
assumed that all individuals are equal by virtue of natural reason, freedom and moral worth. Of
course, it has been hotly contested whether this conception merely guarantees all citizens' equal
access to opportunities or results. Nonetheless, equality's core claim that natural superiority is
dubious and that none are necessarily more deserving than others was defended in texts like the
Declaration of Independence, Elizabeth Cady Stanton's “Declaration of Sentiments” (1848),
Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address (1863) and Martin Luther King's “I Have A Dream”
(1963). In contrast, the thinkers I study here illustrated that citizens were equal through the
permanence of weakness and frailty, which compromised their potential to have unbridled
freedom or have unimpeded flourishing. For Baldwin this was a historically constructed reality
manifest through the experience of psychic alienation, anxiety and guilt as well as an ontological
fact evident in the ever-present possibility of bodily injury, death or uncontrollable desire.
Ellison showed how it was more a product of deep commitment to democratic autonomy and
conscientiousness, which created counterproductive and harmful reverberations for those who
exercised it. Morrison showed how the risking of oneself central to any practice of generosity
always threatened to exacerbate the insecurity of those who gave. It should be noted that in
demonstrating this, their work did not assert that all individuals equally experienced
vulnerability. Furthermore, it did not, as slave-holding conservatives like John C. Calhoun
asserted, argue that citizens were not equal with respect to intellectual potential or the potential
to exercise their freedom.24 Instead, it was a much more modest, even if no less radical, attempt
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at perspective-shifting: to show that one fundamental way in which citizens were equal was that
no one could permanently escape weakness or lack of control over their destiny.
Second, each showed how all forms of American individualism, from its social
democratic to self-interested formulations, were neither ontologically possible nor productive for
human flourishing. Individualism, or the idea that the individual rather than the collective is of
central moral importance, argues that all individuals could and should be self-reliant. Much like
equality, the meaning of self-reliance has varied widely. For Benjamin Franklin, writing in Poor
Richard, it meant the Protestant values of frugality, industriousness, temperance and prudence.25
For Ralph Waldo Emerson, it meant resistance to social conformity, moral self-making and
understanding one's responsibility to others. It is this Emersonian tradition that Jack Turner's
insightful book, Awakening to Race, argues is a potent challenge to conservative conceptions of
personal responsibility based in self-help, self-interest and personal uplift without moral
concern.26 Specifically, drawing from thinkers like Douglass, Baldwin and Ellison, Turner
contends that this social democratic individualism is valuable for racial justice because it
personalizes responsibility about acknowledging one’s complicity in facilitating injustice and
refusing to be complicit in it. Yet Turner’s analysis overlooks how an important aspect of
American political thought was not simply concerned with making individualism more moral or
rejecting it in a favor of more collective concerns.27 Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison believed that
the sovereign, self-sufficient individual was an ontological fiction. For each, the individual was
not only constitutively embedded in society but also governed by this condition. Society's

25

Benjamin Franklin, Franklin: Autobiography, Poor Richard and Later Writings (New York: Library of America,
2005).
26
See Jack Turner, Awakening to Race: Individualism and Social Consciousness in America (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2012).
27
See Michael C. Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

14

formative influence on the individual did not cause a zero-sum game in which collective goals,
interests and desires made it impossible for one to unilaterally exercise their self-sovereignty. It
came instead from the way the individual was inadvertently affected by his or her own social
perceptions of and engagement with others. For example, if racial stereotypes made blacks
victims of bodily and psychic degradation, disrespect and apathy, then these stereotypes
themselves governed white behavior, making whites uncontrollably anxious, paranoid and
repressive. If citizens were seriously committed to equality, freedom and generosity, then its
realization threatened to upend extant social structures, privileges and identity positions that
benefitted whites. At the same time, each showed that ethics itself depended upon a renunciation
of individualism. Identifying with and feeling compassion for marginalized others could come
from the recognition that one's own life already was or would be governed by forces over which
one had little control. Furthermore, knowing that one was held hostage to, rather than sovereign
over, social forces, transcendental principles and other human beings was indispensable for
responsible action.
Third, each of the three writers challenged the assumption that American life is governed
by the genre of romance. Romance names a narrative marked by lovers and their ultimate
reconciliation, by triumphalism over impossible odds and obstacles, by optimism, heroism and
redemption. This narrative cuts across ideological lines in American thought, from the Horatio
Alger rags-to-riches capitalist to the Emersonian moralist, from John Rawls' self-governing
moral subject to Robert Nozick's perfectly free rational actor. Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's
portraits of life were much more tragic: action conceived of as totally positive itself was
responsible for unintended, negative effects; not only was reconciliation impossible but the only
thing permanent was a state of tension, ambiguity and contradiction; emotion dominated reason;
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the liberal dream of permanent safety and security was impossible. Each also showed how life
was ironic: those transcendental, utopian principles that promised happiness were the same
values that required unbearable burden; ethical action required a renunciation of the logic of selfpreservation and self-interest.
Finally, I want to suggest that Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's work itself deepens
normative thinking about how to achieve racial justice in contemporary America. Today, racial
equality is far from a reality in American life. Although the post-segregation moment promised a
post-racial politics that assumed the virtues of colorblindness, the triumph of legal equality and
the end of hegemonic white racism, de facto residential segregation significantly impacts black
education and labor opportunities.28 “Hyper- incarceration” disproportionately disciplines and
punishes black men, while regulating their access to work and citizenship.29 And inequities in
economic wealth, housing and education all continue to foreclose social mobility for black
citizens.30 Some prescriptive arguments about what practices would be most effective at
redressing this condition have stressed that the historical knowledge of slavery and Jim Crow
could make clear how racial inequality is a complex and accumulated network of oppression for
which all Americans are collectively liable.31 Others have stressed the importance that white
citizens acknowledge and renounce the social, economic and political advantage white-skin
offers them.32 Still others argue that what is needed is a revised understanding of equality based
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in fairness that accounts for differences in unchosen history, identity and structural constraints
that shape one’s life chances, rather than calling for an identical treatment of all.33 Yet the
transformative power of memory, the ability to acknowledge whiteness and the willingness to
embrace the abstract norm of fairness can be undercut by other beliefs. None of these things
exists outside of or is unaffected by larger cultural beliefs. The success of each can greatly be
shaped by other salient commitments that are much more foundational. While it is arguable
whether freedom, democracy and generosity wield this kind of power on Americans' every
political judgment and engagement, their centrality in American culture cannot be denied.
Baldwin's, Ellison's and Morrison's visions of how they could be revised to make citizens more
attentive to their privilege, more willing to risk their own social status and support redistributive
socioeconomic policies, is therefore worth attending to.
A few methodological clarifications are in order before I proceed. First, my argument
does not rest on a strong claim of authorial intent. My suggestion is not that all three always
consciously attempted to make political arguments, revise specific cultural understandings or
engage in specific political or intellectual debates. Sometimes their essays made direct, premisebased arguments, yet sometimes their essays and fiction reformulated prevailing understandings
through indirect narratives that deployed rich metaphors and plots; through characters' internal
meditations on themselves, their commitments and action towards others. Whatever the case, the
persuasiveness of my argument rests on what their work tried to say, gesture towards and
dramatize, rather than what each personally believed or thought they were doing. My analysis
always prioritizes the text, although I do often deepen and complicate my readings with the
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author's personal arguments or beliefs. Second, I do not attempt to show how each thinker's
counter-cultural narrative provided a unique, evidence-based reinterpretation of American
political culture. I do not inquire how they participated in or directly challenged historical
interpretations of American political culture as governed by a singular liberal consensus of which
individualism was central,34 —an individualism driven by civic republican strands that valorized
public courage, sacrifice and virtue35 and contained ascriptive elements of biological hierarchy.36
Third, I consider each thinker's texts with an eye towards the substantive arguments they make,
but also through the kinds of narratives they employ.37 This allows me to attend to what is most
explicit in a given text’s language, while also working to uncover what lies hidden beneath its
surface. Studying their narratives critically enables a move beyond discourse analysis to a more
nuanced consideration of language that traces arguments and their contradictions. Fourth, while
many of the texts I examine eschewed deductive political reasoning, I nonetheless try to cull
political insights for what they imply or dramatize about politics. Yet unlike literary theorists
who consider a text’s politics in the way it conceals or constructs certain, partial ideological
truths, I do this with specific attention to how their work created what Sheldon Wolin calls
“political vision.”38 Following Wolin, I explore Baldwin’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s meditation
on the larger political issues of communication, recognition, judgment, action, identity,
community, power, justice, resistance and politics itself. To sharpen our understanding of each
thinker’s political thought as well as expand the canon of political thought itself, I place them
34
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into conversation with various canonical political theorists such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,
Hobbes, Locke, Madison, Nietzsche, Arendt, Habermas and Butler as well as contemporary
debates in democratic theory, the politics of recognition, feminist theory and critical race theory.
Finally, while my analysis is not driven by the concerns of intellectual history, I nevertheless
attend to the various historical intellectual and political contexts in which each thinker writes.39
The outline of this dissertation is as follows. The second chapter argues that a core
preoccupation of James Baldwin’s essays from the early 1950s to the late 1960s was to
dramatize how Americans' freedom was compromised by pervasive vulnerability. I unpack
Baldwin’s argument that white Americans’ conception as attached to freedom blinded them from
acknowledging their own complicity in racial injustice. Next, I identify how his critical revision
of the American founding and American racial history through the lens of psychological and
social vulnerability sought to show why American liberal ideals in American political culture
would themselves not make racial progress certain. Third, I unpack his narrative of shared and
inescapable suffering and attendant argument that understanding this would increase the
likelihood that white Americans would approach African Americans with respect and
compassion. Fourth, I argue that despite the potential for Baldwin’s narratives to be used
contrary to his intentions, they nonetheless deserve attention given the ongoing existence of
Americans’ self-conception as free and freedom-loving.
The third chapter argues that a significant contribution of Ralph Ellison’s novel, Invisible
Man (1952), and essays from the 1950s through early 1990s was to show that racial justice
depended on Americans’ recognizing that commitment to democracy carried tragic implications.
The first part discusses Ellison’s demonstration of how African Americans’ marginalization
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would be more likely if they failed to acknowledge that the exercise of and faith in their own
autonomy could be debilitating. The second part identifies his demonstration of how white
Americans’ failure to recognize that democratic equality requires an acceptance of greater
vulnerability could prevent them from abandoning the social benefits so central to continuing
white skin-privilege. The third part identifies his demonstration of how African Americans’
failure to see that democratic conscientiousness takes attention away from devising political
strategy and could preclude them from creating necessary resources for confronting power. The
fourth part identifies his demonstration of how both white and black Americans‘ failure to see
that the spiritualism, sacredness and idealism of democracy makes it an ongoing, unending
process could make them assume that changes to unequal socioeconomic structures could easily
be achieved. The final part contends that the best way to read Ellison’s problematic, unbridled
valorization of American democracy is as a reflection of the circumscribed nature of American
political discourse.
The fourth chapter argues that Toni Morrison’s novel, Beloved (1987), shows how the
practice of conditional generosity reinforces racial inequality and unconditional generosity has
the potential to mitigate it. The first part identifies the novel’s illumination of the problematic
implications for racial justice of a model of conditional giving and listening. It shows that this
model of generosity allows those who give to remain sovereign over those who receive. A
conditional form of giving thus promotes a hierarchical condition, limits recipients’ ability to
freely construct and obtain their own account of the good and undermines their willingness to
trust those who give. The second part elaborates Beloved’s illumination of unconditional
generosity for racial justice. Such a model rests on the assumption that all persons have
fundamentally equal moral worth, that all persons have subject to a condition of inescapable
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vulnerability; it makes those who give vulnerable to recipients and assumes that recipients are
capable of moral agency. Yet, Beloved also shows that this model is not without risks, as its basis
in care is precisely what can have a monopolizing and counterproductive effect on recipients.
The final part shows how the novel's insights can be used to rethink contemporary American
welfare policy.
The fifth chapter argues that the dissertation carries broader implications for future
scholarship and debates in American studies and American political thought, contemporary
political theory and democratic theory. In addition, I review the way this projects broadens
thinking about contemporary racial politics and black politics. Finally, I explain how the
dissertation provides methodological tools to study American political culture, African American
political thought and African American literature.
In the final analysis, my own agnosticism about the transformative power of narrative
prevents me from substantiating or rejecting arguments that it can be used as a medium through
which political solidarity and empathy may be forged40 and human cruelty revealed.41
Notwithstanding this reservation, I nonetheless aim to show throughout each chapter how each
thinker's work can help inspire a more conscientious and informed form of citizenship. This is
undoubtedly the most difficult aspiration because this project’s thrust is largely exegetical but
nonetheless reflects my hope that important ideas can and should matter outside the books in
which they are written.
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Chapter 2:
James Baldwin’s Critique of American Freedom and Racial Justice
We, as a nation, modified and suppressed and lied about all the darker forces in our history. We
know, in the case of the person,that whoever cannot tell himself the truth about his past is
trapped in it, is immobilized in the prison of his undiscovered self. This is also true of nations.42
The failure on our part to accept the reality of pain, of anguish, of ambiguity, of death has turned
us into a very peculiar people and sometimes monstrous people. It means, for one thing, and it’s
very serious, that people who have had no experience have no compassion.43
-James Baldwin
Introduction: Baldwin on Freedom and Vulnerability
A dominant belief in American political culture is that America was founded in an exceptional
commitment to freedom. Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in American (1955) argued that
Americans understood America to be a unique society that made possible and was committed to
the exercise of self-determination without fetters or constraints. Typifying an argument advanced
by Cold War consensus historians like Richard Hofstadter and Daniel Boorstin,44 Hartz argued
that the Declaration of Independence’s enunciation of freedom established an irrational Lockean
liberal faith in equality of opportunity, property, limited government and representative
government.45 During the postwar period through the late 1960s, this equation of freedom with
America became a centerpiece of liberal Civil Rights rhetoric. Liberals invoked it to persuade
white Americans to enact reforms to end Jim Crow racial segregation.46 The social scientist,
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Gunnar Myrdal, famously argued in An American Dilemma (1944) that America was
exceptionally committed to what he called the “American Creed” of which the moral idea of
freedom was central.47 Social activists, like Martin Luther King, Jr., invoked this argument to
persuade white Americans to support legislation that would grant African Americans equal legal
protection, full political enfranchisement and equal opportunity. 48 Lyndon Johnson’s Great
Society program centralized it to support federal policies aimed at advancing equality of results
for African Americans through jobs, healthcare, welfare and adequate housing. As Johnson
described it in his much-discussed commencement address at Howard University, "To Fulfill
These Rights," on June 4, 1965, “[s]o, it is the glorious opportunity of this generation to end the
one huge wrong of the American Nation and, in so doing, to find America for ourselves, with the
same immense thrill of discovery which gripped those who first began to realize that here, at last,
was a home for freedom.”49
From the immediate postwar period through the late 1960s, James Baldwin’s rejection of
this liberal argument and rhetorical strategy put him at odds with these contemporaries.
Baldwin’s contention was that the white American majority’s belief that they were irrationally
attached to freedom allowed them to preemptively dismiss African American grievances against
structural racial injustice. This prompted him to advance a fundamental critique of Americans’
self-perception as freedom-loving and free, which he believed would be serviceable for helping
them confront such injustice. His critique was unique because it neither showed how structural
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impediments to individual progress made self-reliance impossible50 or called upon Americans to
embrace the ideal of equality over freedom.51 Baldwin’s essays instead dramatized how
Americans’ historical and ontological psychological and social vulnerability compromised their
freedom. First, he illustrated white and black Americans’ historical lack of control over and
unconscious susceptibility to feelings such as alienation, fear, anxiety, guilt and anger. This
narrative challenged the idea that racial progress would simply be fulfilled over time or could be
achieved through better laws and public policies aimed at socioeconomic redistribution. Second,
Baldwin illustrated white and black Americans’ ontological susceptibility to the unavoidable fact
of sickness, suffering and death. This narrative provided the context for his argument that white
and black citizens needed to assist each other unconditionally with critical respect and solidarity.
Baldwin’s turn to the personal reflected his belief that a revised understanding of Americans’
interior lives, everyday habits, emotional lives and physical limitations, rather than a revision of
public policies, laws or legislation, was crucial for a better awareness of and ethical response to
racial reality. Colm Tobin correctly contends that Baldwin understood the country’s racial
dilemma to be a “poison which began in the individual spirit and only made its way then into
politics...that social reform could not occur through legislation alone but through a reimagining
of the private realm.”52 But as I show below, Baldwin also sought to enable Americans to
confront this racial dilemma by rendering fictitious their belief they could ever be unbridled or
invulnerable agents.
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At the level of political theory, Baldwin’s project bared striking resemblances with St.
Augustine’s critique of pride. In City of God, Augustine contended that man’s fall from grace
came through overweening pride, or self-love, which “is the start of every sin.”53 The corrective
to this for Augustine, like Baldwin, was humility, skepticism of one’s free will and recognition
of one’s compulsion to sin.54 Yet Baldwin, unlike Augustine, sought to persuade Americans to
feel more humility about their freedom in a way that compelled them to confront earthly political
power rather than disengage from it. Reading Baldwin in this way offers four important
contributions. First, it provides important insights into Baldwin’s own use of prophetic rhetoric,55
the role of race-consciousness in political theorizing,56 his thinking about self-work and
critique57 and the link between history and politics.58 Second, it deepens contemporary thinking
about the normative value of recognizing vulnerability for democratic citizenship. As central to a
late-modern ethos, Stephen White argues that citizens’ recognizing their mortality could allow
them to identify with and exhibit generosity towards others whose experiences are radically
different.59 More so than White, Baldwin illuminated that the significance of recognizing
vulnerability could be in making citizens more aware of their own potential complicity in
harming others and ensuring that their generosity was unconditional. Third, it revises the
interpretation that Baldwin’s work simply sought to radicalize individualism for racial justice.
Jack Turner reads Baldwin as a black Emersonian, a social- democratic individualist who
53
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radicalized the rugged-individualist idea of personal responsibility by suggesting that
responsibility required citizens to examine their complicity in injustice and work against it.60
Good evidence exists to support Tuner’s interpretation, but I show how Baldwin’s narratives also
sought to demonstrate that citizens’ lack of control over dark emotions and suffering
compromised, if not rendered impossible, self-mastery and self-sovereignty. Fourth, it revises
scholarly understandings that cast Baldwin as a politically irresponsible African American
intellectual. Stanley Crouch famously argued that from The Fire Next Time onward Baldwin’s
writings became politically irresponsible because they were characterized by anger, polemics and
prophecy instead of sophisticated political critique.61 In a similar way, F.W. Dupee has argued
that Baldwin’s replacement of prophecy for criticism cheapened his art and style.62 Yet, both
Crouch and Dupee problematically gauge Baldwin’s political sophistication through his rhetoric
and professed beliefs about black political strategy, rather than the ways in which his work
actually sought to raise Americans’ consciousness about the implications of, as well as revise,
their core self and national understandings. Baldwin’s focus on consciousness-raising was itself
made clear at the conclusion of The Fire Next Time, which rendered racial justice dependent
upon “the relatively conscious whites and relatively conscious blacks” to “create the
consciousness of others.”63 Reducing Baldwin’s political contribution to his own growing
pessimism about the potential for black-white solidarity and racial integration thus ignores that
his work offered diagnostic and normative resources, both of which are crucial preconditions for
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political action even if not directly a call to it.64Attention to this challenges Dupee’s accusation
that Baldwin was socially irresponsible. Criticizing Baldwin’s replacement of “criticism for
prophecy” in The Fire Next Time, Dupee caustically remarked, “is not a writer of Baldwin's
standing obliged to submit his assertions to some kind of pragmatic test, some process whereby
their truth or untruth will be gauged according to their social utility?”65 Dupee’s reduction of
social responsibility to social utility holds black intellectual work, like Baldwin’s, hostage to
reality’s contradictions, imperfections and conventions. Yet social responsibility comes precisely
from a willingness to explode conventional modes of thinking and provide new visions, rather
than confirming extant ones. By exemplifying this, Baldwin’s work challenged Jerry Watts’
insistence that his art was impoverished by his adoption of the victim status, a desire to achieve
from whites recognition of black suffering.66 If anything, Baldwin’s essays sought to universalize
victimhood across racial lines, address whites and blacks and say something truly unique about
American individuality and society.
The uniqueness of Baldwin’s artistic-political contributions also connected to a unique
understanding of art’s function, as a weapon of consciousness-raising centered on dramatizing
universal truths. Baldwin rejected the perspective that art was a private matter in which citizens
were driven by personal standards of excellence. For him, the responsibility of artists was to
provide citizens a richer emotional and linguistic context to understand their society, which was
indispensable for social health. Central to the artist’s role was an exposition of society’s
unspoken truths. As Baldwin explained, ‘life is important, vastly more important than art… [but]
64
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artists are the only people in a society who can tell that society the truth about itself.”67 Baldwin’s
blackness and homosexuality in a nation that marginalized blackness and demonized gay men
and women inspired in him an obvious concern with exposing unspoken truths about black and
gay life that many white, heterosexual Americans misunderstood.68 However, race and sexuality
did not exhaust his artistic concerns.69 Baldwin was thoroughly convinced that the artist’s
responsibility was to show that certain elements of the human condition were universal and
inescapable, elements such as “the state of birth, suffering, love and death.”70 This indirectly
political understanding of art stood in tension with the overtly political claims some of Baldwin’s
essays made about white racism, Black Nationalism, black and white homophobia and white
liberalism.71 Yet this belief also captured a unique understanding of art’s political reach, which
countered Richard Wright’s assertion, central to African American protest literature, that art was
sometimes needed to exaggerate oppressive circumstances to persuade citizens to feel pity and
compel them to direct action against them.72 A reasonable argument is that Baldwin jettisoned his
non-political conception of art with his increasing pessimism and radicalization or never quite
made concrete in his work. However, throughout this chapter, I show that Baldwin’s exposition
of white Americans’ love of America, shared black and white suffering and susceptibility to
death and dramatization of radically new modalities of compassion and generosity challenge
both claims.
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My thesis proceeds through examining Baldwin’s essays not because his fiction was
uninteresting but because his essays from “Many Thousands Gone” (1951) through his collected
book of essays, No Name on the Street (1972), represented a coherent body of work theorizing
racial justice. Baldwin was a prolific essayist, publishing in well-regarded journals that were
popular with intellectuals and educated citizens. Beyond several essay collections, Notes of
Native Son (1955), Nobody Knows My Name (1961) and No Name in the Street (1972), Baldwin
published in journals such as The New Yorker, Playboy, Commentary, Esquire, Harper’s and The
New York Times Book Review. Additionally, although I do not believe The Fire Next Time
(1963) represents a dividing line between his early, political nuanced and later politically
simplistic work, my aim is not to offer an interpretation that invalidates this thesis.73
Baldwin’s Critique of Americans as Free and Freedom-Loving
Born in segregated black Harlem in 1924, a neighborhood marked by black ghettoization and
white police brutality, Baldwin, unlike his liberal contemporaries, was exemplary in his
awareness that the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) U.S. Supreme Court decision would not
solve the national, pervasive and entrenched problem of structural economic and social racial
inequality that existed beyond the law. As he wrote, “Negroes are, therefore, ignored in the
North and are under surveillance in the South, and suffer hideously in both places.”74 Equally
unique was his argument that such inequality was centrally a problem of the white American
majority’s belief that America was an exceptional nation comprised of “freedom-loving
heroes.”75 At some moments, what Baldwin meant by this was that the conviction that America
was a free society perpetuated the ideology of equal opportunity, which rendered white
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Americans unable to see structural conditions that impaired African American progress. In “Fifth
Avenue, Uptown: A Letter from Harlem” (1960), he wrote how “the existence—the public
existence—of, say, Frank Sinatra and Sammy Davis, Jr., proves to them that America is still the
land of opportunity and that inequities vanish before the determined will.”76 Equal opportunity
for all enabled the belief that there were little or no structural obstacles to individual flourishing.
Exceptional individuals’ success suggested that all were given equal opportunity to overcome
their poverty. As a consequence, white and black citizens were seen as solely responsible for
personal uplift through hard-work. At other moments, Baldwin meant white Americans’
embracing the idea of freedom as individualism, which conceptualized individuals as free actors
personally responsible for their own success, rendered African Americans singularly responsible
for their uplift. He wrote that,
“joy is the fruit of Yankee thrift and virtue and makes its sweet appearance only after a
lifetime of cruel self-denial and inveterate moneymaking...if the Negro is ‘happy’ in his
‘place,’ as we still would be only too delighted to believe, then it becomes, it becomes, in
us, a virtue not only to keep him there but to frustrate, for the sake of his continued
happiness and the protection of our property and our profits, any attempt of his to rise out
of it.77
On this interpretation, because African Americans refused to adopt the idea of individualism, as
a consequence of culturally different priorities, white Americans saw themselves as under no
obligation to dismantle their abject living conditions. Because white Americans saw themselves
as virtuous in terms of their own embrace of individualism they felt no obligation to risk their
own wealth and property to liberate African Americans.
Yet Baldwin’s later work, No Name in the Street (1972), revealed his understanding that
what made these beliefs about freedom so problematic was a prior understanding that Americans
were irrationally and affectively committed to it (as “freedom-loving”). The problem stemmed
76
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neither simply from an inaccurate understanding of structural impediments to success nor a
misguided faith in individual perseverance. It came instead from an ideological construct:
Americans’ belief that they loved freedom, rather than simply finding it instrumentally or
politically valuable, convinced them that Americans were obsessed with ensuring and actively
dedicating themselves to the nonexistence of oppression, even in the most unpleasant of
circumstances. Yet this positive self-assessment, a surplus rather than deficit of love, was what
helped delegitimize and displace African American grievances about racial oppression. In
response to one juror’s comments in the 1967 trial of Black Panther, Huey P. Newton’s alleged
murder of an Oakland police officer, that racism needed to be eliminated from the minds of
citizens and not through black confrontations with police officers in their streets, Baldwin made
this argument clear:
This is a fairly vivid and accurate example of the American piety at work. The beginning
of the statement is revealing indeed: “—racism, bigotry, and segregation is something we
have to wipe out of our hearts and minds and “not in the street.” One can wonder to
whom the “we” here refers, but there isn’t any question as the object of the tense, veiled
accusation contained in “not in the street.” Whoever the “we” is, it is probably not the
speaker—to leave it at that: but the anarchy and danger “on the street” are the fault of the
blacks. Unnecessarily: for the police are honorable, and the courts are just.
It is not accident that American cling to this dream. It involves American self-love on
some deep, disastrously adolescent level. And Americans are very carefully and
deliberately conditioned to believe this fantasy: by their politicians, by the news they get
and the way they read it, by the moves, and the television screen, and by every aspect of
the popular culture. 78
Notwithstanding Baldwin’s uncritical celebration of the Black Panthers and their romantic view
of self-defense and resistance in the late 1960s, 79 his point was that white Americans’ clinging
to the idea that they were irrationally driven by freedom rendered them unable to see that the
American state protected some of its citizens more than others. By 1972, the real gains of the
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Civil Rights movement made it unlikely that an audience would accept a critique of racial
inequality based in white Americans’ impoverished ethical imagination, failure of white
American political willpower to enact the public policies necessary to mitigate it or the more
nefarious, concerted effort of social control stemming from the fear of black deviance. Playing
on the white juror’s ambiguous use of the pronoun “we” to designate the uncertainty of who was
responsible for ending racial tensions between blacks and whites, Baldwin thus explained that
racial inequality partly came forcefully, even if indirectly, from white Americans’ failure to
imagine themselves as not affectively attached to freedom. This argument offered an implicit
theory of misrecognition that emphasized how it came from citizens’ deep attachments and selfperceptions rather than failure to understand others. Some recognition theorists insist that a
failure to acknowledge the moral salience of one’s reality constitutes a form of disrespect that
comes from an individual failure of moral responsibility or reification of others as objects.80
Misrecognition in American racial politics, for Baldwin, came from white Americans’ deepseated belief that police officers would not abuse their power and that their courts would always
issue impartial decisions necessitated the assumption that the problem lied beyond their
institutions. African Americans were thus responsible for the police response their actions
elicited because they adopted violent or anti-authoritarian attitudes when they resisted police
authority (“the anarchy and danger ‘on the street’ are the fault of the blacks”). Several pages
later, Baldwin crystallized how this prevented whites Americans from acknowledging the real
lack of police security afforded black citizens and justified their failure to dismantle the black
ghetto:“[w]hite America remains unable to believe that black America’s grievances are real...and
the effect of this massive and hostile incomprehension is to increase the danger in which all
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black people live here, especially the young.”81
Vulnerability throughout American History
Yet one crucial rhetorical strategy of Baldwin’s that sought to make white and black citizens
tackle such racial injustice was retelling American history. It is not hyperbolic to argue that
Baldwin’s obsession with history was more central than his preoccupation with race. At the
personal as well as national level, history was the collection of events, experiences and actions
that solidified identity. Knowing history was crucial for life. The suppression of darker historical
truths was not simply problematic on factual or normative grounds but was harmful because it
imprisoned Americans to repeat those truths. As Baldwin once put it, “we, as a nation, modified
and suppressed and lied about all the darker forces in our history. We know, in the case of the
person, that whoever cannot tell himself the truth about his past is trapped in it, is immobilized in
the prison of his undiscovered self. This is also true of nations.”82 Baldwin’s conception of
history’s power explains why, as David Blight correctly notes, his essays in the 1950s and 1960s
engaged in a public, popular revision of American history that centralized the unromantic, antiliberal, violent and exploitative history of slavery when such an account was missing from the
public discourse.83 No matter how insightful, Blight’s account inadequately explores how a
central concern of Baldwin’s work was to advance a public-historical narrative of American
history that emphasized shared white and black vulnerability in everyday life. This narrative
offered a critique of Americans’ romantic conceptions as free and freedom-loving and of the idea
that racial inequality was aberrational or easy to dismantle. Baldwin demonstrated that from
American origins through American racial history unwanted, unconscious feelings compromised
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and perpetually threatened Americans’ potential to be sovereign over their behaviors. This
narrative did not simply tell American origins or slavery in a way that rendered factually
inaccurate American political culture’s commitment to freedom, equality, tolerance, democracy
or declaration of ever-present progress. It instead tried to disrupt the force of American liberal
ideas to ever be successfully manifest or gain traction in American institutions, even if public
commitment to them was widespread. Understanding Baldwin revision of history clarifies his
call for historical awareness, long seen as central to his political thought.84
First, Baldwin highlighted the pervasiveness of depthless alienation in American origins.
His own experience of alienation as gay black man in America made him an expatriate in Paris,
yet this expatriate experience itself occasioned his first sustained consideration of American
identity in his essay collection, Notes of a Native Son (1955). Following his cursory statement in
“Encounter on the Seine,” (1950) that “this depthless alienation from oneself and from one’s
people is, in sum, the American experience,”85 he claimed in “Question of Identity” (1954) that
“our history…is the history of the total, and willing, alienation of entire peoples from
their forebears. What is overwhelmingly clear, it seems, to everyone but ourselves is that
this history has created an entirely unprecedented people, with a unique and individual
past. It is, indeed, this past which has thrust upon us our present, troubling role.”86
The vast majority of scholars have interpreted Baldwin’s rooting American origins in citizens’
unprecedented alienation from their culture and tradition as reflecting his own early American
patriotism. Some insist that this expressed an optimistic conviction that America’s beginning in a
productive kind of amnesia allowed for a spirit of continued national reinvention, which could
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ultimately eradicate race.87 Others insist that it expressed his thesis that the cultural alienation of
both American blacks and whites allowed America to be exemplary in disproving the validity of
race.88 But what these readings overlook is that Baldwin’s narrative of citizens’ alienation from
culture dramatized the psychological unease felt upon arrival. Not only were the first Americans
strangers in a new land, but they were without social status or cultural memory. A feeling of vast
uncertainty, terror and loss of identity rather than freedom marked the American national
beginning. What made this past so troubling was therefore a primordial disconnection, marked
by a loss of one’s roots, rather than simply a new optimistic beginning. To highlight this as a
universal, cross-racial experience, Baldwin argued that this alienation was also true for African
slaves. He wrote how “in the case of the Negro the past was taken from whether he would or
no.”89
Second, Baldwin’s later essays highlighted how this primordial alienation was inspired
and accompanied by a host of contingent, corporeal desires driven by desperation. In a 1963
essay, “A Talk to Teachers,” months after Birmingham, Alabama safety commissioner, Bull
Connor, authorized city police officers to use attack dogs upon non-violent, young black
protestors and white terrorists murdered four young girls in the 16th Street Baptist Church in
Birmingham, Baldwin argued that a commitment to freedom was nonexistent at the American
founding:
What passes for identity in America is a series of myths about one’s heroic ancestors. It’s
astounding to me, for example, that so many people really appear to believe that the
country was founded by a band of heroes who wanted to be free. That happens not to be
true. What happened was that some people left Europe because they couldn’t stay there
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any longer and had to go someplace else to make it. That’s all. They were hungry, they
were poor, they were convicts. Those who were making it in England, for example, did
not get on the Mayflower. That’s how the country was settled.90
Baldwin’s narrative of Americans origins as founded in human frailty and bare necessity at once
tried to contextualize such white racial violence in the 1960s and challenge Cold War patriotic
narratives that rendered the pilgrims as invincible, omnipotent and irrationally obsessed with
freedom. Pervasive anxiety rather than invincibility, need rather than idealism, contingency
rather than necessity formed America. The first settlers came to the New World to survive rather
than flourish, driven by the banal needs to stave off hunger, poverty and the pragmatic desire to
escape from religious persecution.
On the one hand, Baldwin’s other writings made clear that the white majority’s feeling of
alienation, anxiety and desperation were managed through anti-black racism, which positioned
the black minority at the bottom of the social ladder and kept slavery intact. He argued “In
Search of a Majority” (1960) that “the Negro tells us where the bottom is: because he is there,
and where he is, beneath us, we know where the limits are and how far we must no fall. We must
not fall below him.” 91 On the other hand, he described that the uneasy feelings whites sought to
manage were simply displaced unequally unto blacks. Anti-black racism itself created in blacks
intense anxiety, terror, humiliation and doubt about their self-worth, all of which was simply
intensified through a long history of denigration, rape and torture of black bodies. As he
explained in The Fire Next Time (1963), “this past, the Negro’s past, of rope, fire, torture,
castration, infanticide, rape; death and humiliation; fear by day and night, fear as deep as the
marrow of the bone; doubt that he was worthy of life, since everyone around him denied it.”92
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Third, Baldwin’s early essay, “Many Thousands Gone” (1951), narrated the American
racial experience as one in which white Americans’ envisioning blacks as radically sub-human
and super-human created in blacks an uncontrollable rage but in so doing also solidified white
Americans’ uncontrollable anxiety. Political theoretical interpretations of the essay usually stress
Baldwin’s centralization of African American slavery to American history to challenge the
dominant trope that American history was somehow beautiful, exceptional and morally
exemplary.93 It is true that he began the essay with the assertion that “the story of the Negro in
America is the story of America—or, more precisely, it is the story of Americans. It is not a very
pretty story: the story of a people is never very pretty.”94 Yet a central objective of the essay was
to dramatize the hidden unpleasant emotions, rather than empirical fact of racial oppression, that
actually made this black-white history of America not so pretty:
Aunt Jemima and Uncle Tom are dead, their places taken by a group of amazingly
well-adjusted young men and women, almost as dark, ferociously literate, welldressed...Before, however, our joy at the demise of Aunt Jemima and Uncle Tom
approaches the indecent, we had better ask where they sprang, how they lived? Into what
limbo they have vanished?
However inaccurate our portraits of them were, these portraits do suggest, not only the
conditions, but the quality of their lives and the impact of this spectacle on our
consciences. There was no one more forbearing than Aunt Jemima, no one stronger and
more pious and more loyal or wise; there was, at the same time, no one weaker or more
faithless or more vicious and certainly no one more immoral.Uncle Tom, trustworthy and
sexless, needed to drop the title “Uncle” to become violent, crafty and sullen…[but]this
was the piquant flavoring to the national joke, it lay behind our uneasiness as it lay
behind our benevolence: Aunt Jemima and Uncle Tom, our creations, at last evaded us;
they had a life--their own, perhaps a better life than ours--and they would never tell us
what it was. At the point where we were driven most privately and painful to conjecture
what depths of contempt, what heights of indifference, what prodigies of resilience, what
untamable superiority allowed them so vividly to endure, neither perishing nor rising up
in a body to wipe us from the earth, the image perpetually shattered and the word failed.
The black man in our midst carried murder in his heart, he wanted vengeance. We carried
murder too, we wanted peace. 95
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Notice that the purpose of Baldwin’s narrative was not simply to show that these racist images
expressed whites’ single-handed, vehement dehumanization of blacks, to highlight their social
constructivism or to render them factually inaccurate. Deploying the racially ambiguous
pronouns “our” and “we,” Baldwin instead described these images as functioning dialectically,
themselves imprinting upon and governing both black and white consciences. His description
that these images evaded “us,” or came to exercise a power over those who wielded and
experienced them, showed how they carried anb almost sovereign ability to single-handedly,
unexpectedly shape black and white feelings, which invariably determined their behavior. That
blacks were cast as superhuman in their trustworthiness, forgiveness and chastity created a deep
doubt in whites about whether their own behavior was moral exemplary. That blacks were also
exemplary in their viciousness resentment and hyper-sexuality made whites fearful that they
would violently retaliate against them. However, these humiliating images fostered for blacks
feelings of anger, rage and a thirst for vengeance and retribution. Paradoxically, white fear of
black retaliation, at first a product of an inaccurate, fantastical and misguided understanding of
black identity, became real. Baldwin described this black rage, what he elsewhere called the
“rage of the disesteemed,” “an internal warfare from which “no black man can hope to entirely
liberated,”96 in the following way: “And there is, I should think, no Negro living in American
who has not felt, briefly or for long periods, with anguish sharp or dull...simple naked and
unanswerable hatred; who has not wanted to smash any white face he may encounter...”97 This
narrative was at odds with the essay’s critique of Wright’s Native Son, which he believed
problematically foregrounded the singularity of black rage at the expense of the much larger,
complex psychological reality that contained genuine, even if painful, anguished, love towards
96
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whites. Yet Baldwin’s emphasis on black Americans’ lack of control over their rage, read
alongside whites’ attendant lack of control over their anxiety and fear over blacks, paralleled and
in certain ways continued the cross-racial alienation evident at the founding. Alienation not from
one’s past or culture, but from one’s self. That there was an emotional reality to this black rage
and white fear showed that the dubiousness of these stereotypes made them no less real,
powerful and threatening to black and white citizens’ freedom. Against declarations from liberal
intellectuals in the 1950s that racial progress was just around the corner, the much-discussed
following passage argued that the persistence of these racial images suffocated the potential for
black-white receptive listening and communication so necessary for racial justice:
In our image of the Negro breathes the past we deny, not dead but living yet and
powerful, the beast in our jungle of statistics. It is this which defeats us, which continues
to defeat us, which lends to interracial cocktail parties their rattling, genteel, nervously
smiling air…Wherever the Negro face appears a tension is created, the tension of a
silence filled with things unutterable.98
Situating this point within the context of the essay reveals that its purpose was not simply to
show that, as P.J. Brendese suggests, “[racial] histories are lodged in the subconscious registers,
habituated practices and presumptions that make up who we are.”99That “our image of the
Negro” continued to exist through what he described earlier in the essay as “statistics, slums,
rapes, injustice, remote violence,”100 which threatened to reproduce earlier white racial
assumptions that blacks were dangerous but also pious for withstanding oppression, made the
beast of this past of psychological vulnerability alive. Foregrounding how uncontrollable
emotions could easily undo the possibility of the reasoned, undistorted communication so central
to what Jürgen Habermas sees as deliberative action,101 Baldwin highlighted how these images
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would undermine Americans’ freedom to listen and deliberate. Contra Habermas, neither the
regulative force of reason nor truthful, non-coercive speech acts were sufficient for promoting
agreement if citizens were fundamentally governed by emotional states. Baldwin’s was not a
critique Habermas’ unwillingness to value emotion but instead his failure to see that emotion was
itself constitutive of and often threatening to communication.102
Fourth, Baldwin’s narrative emphasized how this racial history created and perpetuated
white feelings of guilt. In “The Uses of the Blues” (1964), he reframed racism as not that which
simply promoted in whites an unthinking kind of moral apathy but that which produced an
entrenched guilt from a latent realization that they were responsible for dehumanizing other
human beings. As he put it,
The [white]American found himself in a very peculiar situation because he knew black
people were people...For one thing, it created in Americans a perpetual guilt, hidden,
festering and, entirely unadmitted guilt. Guilt is a very peculiar emotion. As long as you
are guilty about something, no matter what it is, you are not compelled to change it.103
Baldwin’s argument that anti-black racism created white guilt was obviously a speculative leap.
It assumed white Americans to be latently moral rather than purely self-interested and that their
investment in racism engendered, rather than masked, negative feelings about themselves. These
problems notwithstanding, Baldwin’s claim was not simply an argument about racism but itself a
narrative that tried to persuade white Americans’ to rethink themselves as fundamentally weak
rather than powerful. That this guilt was real and festering, even if hidden and unadmitted,
suggested that their behavior was governed by things and in ways over which they had little
control. That this guilt immobilized the action necessary for overturning it and from which it
originated pointed to its debilitating effects for change.
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Yet Baldwin’s later writings supplemented this narrative about white guilt coming from
racism with an account that stressed how an entrenched, almost uncontrollable investment in
racism itself came from white guilt over perpetually denying their responsibility for slavery.
Writing in August of 1965 just months after president Lyndon Johnson’s commencement address
at Howard University, which argued that a “blanket of history and circumstance” or "the
devastating heritage of long years of slavery; and a century of oppression, hatred, and
injustice"104 Baldwin, like Johnson, made clear how the past shaped the present. In his essay,
“White Man’s Guilt” (1965)” he wrote,
White man, hear me! History, as nearly no one seems to know, is not merely something
to be read. And it does not refer merely, or even, principally, the past. On the contrary,
the great force of history comes from the fact that we carry it within us, are
unconsciously controlled by it in many ways, and history is literally present in all that we
do. It could scarcely be otherwise, since it is to history that we owe our frames of
reference, our identities, and our aspirations.105
Baldwin, like Johnson, sought to persuade Americans to see themselves as their own beliefs and
actions as subject to a past not of their own choosing, rather than as freely and self-consciously
determined. Baldwin’s ambiguous understanding of how history shaped the present implied
everything from a claim that certain past events or an accumulation of past events shaped the
contours of the present to the idea that past events were repeated in the present. Furthermore, it
ranged from an argument that past events informed Americans’ political, social and economic
opportunities (placed one where one is) to a more broad account of how it shaped their outlook
on the world (frames of reference, identities and aspirations). Whatever Baldwin’s intention,
Deak Nabers argues that Baldwin’s turn to historical legacies by his mid-1960s writings sought
to persuade white Americans that the Civil Rights legislation that promised African Americans
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formal equality under the law could not undo the effects of white racism.106 Nabers is correct that
passages such as this offered the armor for arguments that the legacy of slavery made blacks
vulnerable by creating a pathological culture, a position that could easily reinforce white
racism.107 As the essay unfolded, Baldwin problematically echoed this cultural pathology
argument so central to Johnson’s speech when he suggested that slavery destroyed the black
nuclear family, led to black drug addiction and criminal behavior. Rather than narrowly argue
that slavery and Jim Crow diminished African American access to socioeconomic opportunities,
like equal housing, schooling, jobs and healthcare, he suggested that “the black American finds
himself facing the terrible roster of his lost: the dead, black junkie, the defeated, black father; the
unutterably weary, black mother; the unutterably ruined, black girl.”108
Yet Nabers overlooks how a central rhetorical objective of “White Man’s Guilt” was to
argue that white Americans’ lack of control over entrenched guilt for racial oppression itself
exemplified a form of cultural pathology. Nabers ignores that Baldwin universalized cultural
pathology in a way that challenged Johnson’s reduction of it to black culture, describing
uncontrollable white guilt as paradoxically creating an ever deeper, irrational and compulsive
investment in racism. On Baldwin’s interpretation, white Americans’ vulnerability came not, as
it did for blacks, from a legacy of slavery that constrained their socioeconomic opportunities but
from a latent feeling of guilt that came from their public-cultural and personal denial of
responsibility for slavery. He wrote,
“What they see is an appallingly oppressive and bloody history, known all over the
world. What they see is a disastrous, continuing present, condition which menaces them,
and for which they bear an inescapable responsibility. But since in the main, they seem to
lack the energy to change this condition, they would rather not be reminded of it...In any
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case...the guilt remains, more deeply rooted, more securely lodged, than the oldest of
trees.”109
If “In the Uses of the Blues” Baldwin argued that guilt came from racism, what he suggested
here was that racism was reinforced through the very guilt that came from a repeated failure to
accept responsibility for slavery. Several passages later he made vivid this point through the
example of the interracial everyday encounter, which has been repeated since the abolition of
slavery:
This is the place in which it seems to me, most Americans find themselves. Impaled.
They are dimly, or vividly aware that the history they have fed themselves is a lie, but
they do not know how to release themselves from it, and they suffer enormously from the
resulting personal incoherence. This incoherence is heard nowhere more plainly than in
those stammering, terrified dialogues which white American sometimes entertain with
the black conscience, the black Man in America. The nature of this stammering can be
reduced to a plea: Do not blame me, I was not there, I did not do it. My history has
nothing to do with Europe or the slave trade. Anyway, it was your chiefs who sold you to
me. I was not present on the middle passage.110
The above example showed how white guilt over failure to accept responsibility for slavery
became rationalized on the basis of black inferiority: as the cause of African tribal chiefs, rather
than white society. African tribal chiefs became a racist representation of blacks as either powerhungry or less moral than whites and allowed whites to conceptualize themselves as innocent
bystanders who were passively forced to deal with enslavement. Yet this racism created not
simply a morally abhorrent worldview but morally abhorrent violent behavior. As he wrote,
No curtain under heaven is heavier than the curtain of guilt and lies behind which white
American hide. That curtain may prove to be yet more deadly to the lives of human
beings [than the Iron Curtain]. The American curtain is color. Color. White men have
used this word, this concept, to justify unspeakable crimes, not only in the past, but in the
present...One has only to ask oneself who established this distance, who is this distance
designed to protect, and from what is this distance designed to offer protection.
I have seen this all very vividly, for example, in the eyes of southern law enforcement
officers barring, let us say, the door to a courthouse...In a moment, because he could
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resolve this situation in no other way, this sheriff...began to club these [unarmed black
people] down...And for a moment, therefore, he seemed to be pleading with the people
facing him not to force him to commit yet another crime and not to make yet deeper that
ocean of blood in which his conscience was drenched, and his manhood perishing...So
the club rose, the blood came down, and his bitterness and his anguish and his guilt were
compounded.
And I have seen it in the eyes of rookie cops in Harlem...who pretend to themselves that
the black junkie, the black father, the black child were of different human species than
themselves. The southern sheriff, the rookie cop, could, and I suspect still can only deal
with their lives and their duties by hiding behind the color curtain...They thus will
barricade themselves behind this curtain and continue in their crime, in the great
unadmitted crime of what they have done to themselves. 111
Violence and moral apathy, both of which perpetuated black oppression, culminated the process
that began with guilt. As the curtain created by lies and guilt and that behind which whites hid,
racism perpetuated guilt by making whites degrade blacks. The example of the white Southern
sheriff’s violence towards black protestors and the white Harlem rookie cop’s moral apathy
towards northern black citizens languishing in the ghetto illuminated something important about
white Americans’ agency. That neither the sheriff nor cop wanted to see blacks as inferior but to
did so to insulate themselves from the latent guilt they felt about their failure to take
responsibility for slavery illustrated that guilt compromised white Americans’ freedom to
renounce racism. This narrative made increasingly difficult for whites to displace the cause of
contemporary structural racial inequality upon a history of black American cultural degradation
or see their own culture as non-pathological.
Baldwin’s psychological narrative of freedom’s compromise in America differed from
the account of the psychoanalytic critical theorist, Erich Fromm. Fromm’s argument in Escape
from Freedom (1941) was that freedom in modernity was existentially unbearable because its
giving of power to the individual rather than the community created anxiety, which was managed
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through embracing authoritarianism or social conformity.112 Baldwin, like Fromm, showed how
internal, psychological, individual rather than strictly collective, political forces compromised
freedom not simply because of feelings of anxiety over loneliness, but over social status, fear,
rage and guilt. Furthermore, Baldwin’s pre-political, personal and social history also implicitly
challenged his contemporary, Hannah Arendt’s, thesis in On Revolution (1963) that the
American political founding was an exemplary political revolution precisely in its prioritization
of the public sphere of political freedom and equality as opposed to the social sphere of necessity
and inequality.113 Baldwin made clear instead that the social could never be easily divorced from
the political, even if it was artificially divorced in the fabricated documents of the American
state, the Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Dark personal feelings and social
anxieties could always threaten the transformative power of the political. Yet at the same time,
Baldwin’s narrative dramatized the political value of history differently from Arendt. Arendt
believed that history was politically transformative because recalling forgotten deeds and
concepts in the public sphere could revise and enliven political possibility in the present.114
Baldwin instead used history to draw Americans’ attention to their limitations, rather than simply
energize their political thought and action. His belief was that Americans’ ability to recognize
their origins as founded in alienation, desperation, division and a general feeling of anxiety could
make them increasingly less likely to assume that their society was somehow driven by freedom.
He wrote,
I know the myth tells us that heroes came looking for freedom...but the relevant truth is
that the country was settled by a desperate, divided, and rapacious horde of people who
were determined to forget their pasts and determined to make money. We certainly have
not changed in this respect and this is proved by our faces, by our children, by our
absolutely unspeakable loneliness, and the spectacular ugliness and hostility of our cities.
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Despair: perhaps it is this despair which we should attempt to examine if we hope to
bring water to this desert.115
Departing from Arendt, Baldwin argued that acknowledging these basic, disruptive and amoral
human truths and realities evident in American origins would enable citizens to understand how
these motivations became manifest in lonely individuals and decrepit American cities.
Mobilizing the interracial “we,” Baldwin implied that only through an honest examination of this
history would it become evident for whites and blacks that the standards conducive to
psychological and social health, peace and prosperity were not yet in place. Only through this
examination would it become clear that such standards would not magically come into being.
And only then would the potential for a conversation about the need to establish them emerge. In
this sense, Baldwin’s telling of a hidden black-white psychological experience throughout
American history thus offered a powerful critique of the idea that racial inequality contradicted
and departed from America’s founding commitment to freedom. Narrating this everyday, private
reality governed by vulnerability challenged arguments that blacks were free to determine their
lives and whites would continue to extend and realize for all the liberal ideals so central to
American public culture. Uncontrollable, unconscious everyday emotions would continue to
constrain, compromise, if not completely undermine, Americans freedom and ability to be
freedom-loving. The existence of these emotions would continue to make increasingly difficult
the idea that racial inequality could simply be abolished with better, non-discriminatory laws or
that it would eventually be achieved over time.
Notwithstanding this, Baldwin’s rhetorical revision of American history was
problematically insensitive to gender differences. That his revision failed to specify the
difference in black women’s oppression confirms the troubling fact that Baldwin’s intersectional
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identity did not prevent him from failing to account for black women’s experiences and the
gendered nature of racial power. Indeed, Lawrie Balfour correctly notes that his increasing use of
masculinist language and preoccupation with emasculation in the 1960s and 1970s itself
“deafen[ed] Baldwin to claims about the gendered structure of power among African
Americans.”116 This blindness threatened Baldwin’s project, but an even deeper critique could
be made. That Baldwin could have depicted these feelings in the present without referencing
history raises the question of whether his retelling of history was logically necessary. A
preliminary answer centers not on the logical but pragmatic-political importance of revising
history. During Baldwin’s time, the historical narratives of Myrdal, Johnson and King sought to
authorize political action for racial equality during the Civil Rights movement and Cold War era.
Today, influential political scientists have reiterated this assumption and tried to describe the
kinds of historical stories of nationhood necessary for collective action.117 That historical
argumentation has been and can still be a crucial source of American political action makes it
important to engage politically even if not logically.
Finally, understanding Baldwin’s work as retelling American history as a “nightmare
from which no one can awaken”118 complicates understandings of his relationship to Cold War
intellectuals. One interpretation is that while his later work in the 1970s distanced itself from the
pro-American rhetoric of American exceptionalism, Baldwin’s early work, launched on the cusp
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of the Cold War, embraced it for strategic reasons.119 Another interpretation is that Baldwin’s
participation in what Vaughn Raspberry calls the “anti-colonial zeitgeist’s” critique of racial
integration as progress militated against the arguments of Cold War intellectuals.120 There is
ample evidence to support reading Baldwin as member and critic of Cold War intellectuals, but
my interpretation suggests something more complex. That Baldwin retold American history as a
way to persuade Americans to rethink their self-understandings as free reflected his awareness
that core American narratives required engagement and an optimistic faith that change was
possible. At the same time, Baldwin’s historical narrative countered the image of history as a
dream progressively moving towards greater freedom, but did so indirectly: not as a direct
political critique of progress but through a narrative of an un-patriotic, darker psychological
American history. We should therefore read Baldwin’s project as governed by a constitutive
tension between his personal hope in the creation of a new, moral American people and initiating
a new American founding and a sober understanding of and rhetorical presentation of reality that
undermined this hope.
The Ontological State of Vulnerability: Suffering and Responsibility
Baldwin’s historically specific account of American vulnerability itself extended to a deeper
account of how it was an ontological, inescapable and permanent fact of human life. His
narrative of human suffering as inevitable sought to undermine the belief that it was something
from which some Americans could be immune or permanently transcend through personal
willpower. Suffering was either lurking somewhere beneath the shadows or would eventually
surface, even when it seemed nonexistent. As Baldwin put it, “every person, everybody born,
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from the time he’s found out about people until the whole thing is over, is certain of one thing:
he is going to suffer. There is no way not to suffer.”121 Not only could social obstacles always
counteract one’s personal resolve, he declared, but lack of control over sickness and death, “the
only fact we have,”122 could come unexpectedly. Baldwin’s making suffering ontological
challenged John Locke’s formulation that human equality meant individuals’ equal access to
reason or free birth. His description of emotional and bodily vulnerability could always
compromise one’s freedom mirrored Thomas Hobbes’s assertion that human life in the state of
nature was defined by the ever-present specter of violence and death.123 Yet Baldwin’s point
ultimately differed from Hobbes’ because it positioned this reality as a foundation for ethics,
rather than as a justification for a social contract that empowered a sovereign, powerful state. As
Baldwin put it, to understand that suffering was inescapable was to be “responsible to life... the
small beacon in that terrifying darkness from which we come and to which we shall return.”124
To be sure, most accounts equate Baldwin’s conception of ethics with “love,” which, as Stephen
Marshall notes, was a model of civic virtue that called upon would be loves to disclosed a hidden
reality to their beloved who could not see this reality but needed to in order to change their
personally and socially damaging ways.125 However, Baldwin did not simply advocate, as was
made clear in his introductory letter to his nephew in The Fire Next Time, for African Americans
to approach whites compassionately or to see the world through their perspective. He argued
instead that recognizing the ontological nature of suffering would make citizens more empathetic
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and unconditionally responsive to others out of respect rather than pity. Baldwin’s essay, “The
Uses of the Blues” (1964) made this point apparent:
The failure on our part to accept the reality of pain, of anguish, of ambiguity, of death has
turned us into a very peculiar people and sometimes monstrous people. It means, for one
thing, and it’s very serious, that people who have had no experience have no
compassion...[they] suppose that if a man is a thief, he is a thief; but, in fact, that’s the
most important thing about him. The most important thing about him is that he is a man
and, furthermore, that if he’s a thief or a murderer or whatever he is, you could also be
and you would know this, anyone would know this who had really dared to live. Miles
Davis once gave poor Billie Holiday one hundred dollars and somebody said, “Man,
don’t you know she’s going to go out and spend it on dope?” and Miles said, “Baby, have
you ever been sick?”126
Baldwin’s argument was that Americans’ persistent demonization of those deemed morally
deficient like thieves and murders came not from apathy but from a belief that they were
suffering from deficient willpower, incapable of adequately mastering their weakness to perform
heinous acts. Those who did not kill or steal thus reflected exemplary moral virtue, as they
successfully mastered their weakness, desire through personal dedication. Insofar as this
understanding discouraged generous assistance Baldwin showed through Miles Davis’
exemplary awareness of the inescapability of pain, anguish and lack of control over his and
others’ freedom how a revised understanding could encourage it. Davis’ rejoinder to the
argument that his aid to Billie Holiday was misguided because it only enabled her addiction
reflected an awareness that vulnerability was something that all had or would experience
throughout their lives. His response, “Baby, have you ever been sick?,” was a critique of the idea
that some could freely and permanently manage their sickness. That Baldwin framed this
awareness as that which enabled Davis to respond ethically to Holiday’s plea itself anticipated
Judith Butler’s recent argument about the importance of reframing life as governed by
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constitutive precariousness, under threat and subject to injury, for responsibility.127 Yet, through
Davis’ example, Baldwin went farther than Butler by showing how this understanding was
crucial for assistance based in critical respect, itself crucial for challenging the paternalism and
assumption of inferiority so central to maintaining racial inequality. Davis’ acknowledgement of
the inevitability of sickness gave way to an assumption that Holiday was his equal rather than
inferior, which made him feel empathy based on personal experiences he shared with Holiday
and sympathy based on a generalized identification without knowing or sharing her emotional
state. Even though Holiday’s plea came for an unhealthy drug addiction, Davis assumed
Holiday’s agency and humanity. Yet this understanding also made his aid unconditional,
centered on mitigating suffering and not governed by condescending charity or moral
chastisement since he knew full well that he would almost certainly require such assistance in the
future.
Baldwin’s casting of Davis’ model as exemplary provides insights into his own theory of
ethics. His theory departed from accounts that made responsibility dependent upon Kantian
rational determinations about universalizable norms128 or utilitarian calculations about the
greatest happiness.129 Ethics, for Baldwin, came from an almost hyper awareness of one’s and
others’ physical and emotional precariousness just as it consisted of an unconditional response
that did not rely upon or reproduce a hierarchical relationship. Ultimately, Baldwin’s concluded
“The Uses of the Blues” with a sober optimism. There was no guarantee that recognizing
vulnerability, captured in the slave songs from which the blues originated, could inspire
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legislative reforms, more just public policy or more accountable political or economic
institutions. However, it could increase the likelihood that citizens approached others with deeper
respect, more generosity and less distance in everyday life. As Baldwin explained, “[p]eople who
in some sense know who they are cannot change the world always, but they can do something to
make it a little more, to make life a little more human. Human in the best sense. Human in terms
of joy, freedom which is always private, respect, respect for one another, even such things as
manners.”130
From a different angle, Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time foregrounded something “The
Uses of the Blues” only implied: that individuals’ willingness to accept vulnerability was itself
an intrinsic part of genuine assistance. The following passage made explicit how Davis’
providing Holiday assistance, despite outside social ostracism and it making him one hundred
dollars poorer, reflected an exemplary willingness to risk oneself. He wrote,
It is rare indeed that people give. Most people guard and keep; they suppose that it is
they themselves and what they identify with themselves that they are guarding and
keeping, whereas what they are actually guarding and keeping is their system of reality
and what they assume themselves to be. One can give nothing whatever without giving
oneself--that is to say, risking oneself. If one cannot risk oneself, then one is simply
incapable of giving.131
Selfishness or rational self-interest, Baldwin insisted, was not problematic because of its petty,
self-centered concern with one’s needs but because it reflected a desire to preserve one’s reality
and self-assumptions. Genuine assistance entailed a non-rational willingness to renounce selfpreservation because it was based in an anti-individualistic, radical deferring to the agency of
others. This meant one’s preparedness to risk their social and economic security and accept an
unknown, radically transformed reality. Giving required accepting greater psychic burden, social
unease and self-doubt. Several pages later, Baldwin argued that racial justice itself depended on
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whites’ embracing this understanding. As he wrote, “[t]he price of this transformation is the
unconditional freedom of the Negro; it is not too much to say that he, who has so long been
rejected, must now be embraced, and at no matter what psychic or social risk.”132 To concretize
this argument politically, genuine ethical assistance required fully dismantling the black ghetto
even if it imposed higher taxes on white citizens; ensuring that full legal equality meant equal
African American participation in constructing laws, even if it entailed changes to the electoral
system that diminished the white electorate’s power; honoring African Americans’ distinct
visions of the good life, even if this meant white Americans’ abandoning the belief that their
visions of the good life were universal. Such giving depended on willingness to accept that the
possibility of pain, uncertainty and ambiguity that loss of white-skin privilege would necessitate.
Ultimately, these arguments reflected Baldwin’s awareness that confronting racial
injustice required dispensing with racist images of black difference upon which it subsisted.
Reframing suffering as inescapable challenged the racist assumption that blacks were somehow
inferior and unequal to whites. Reframing assistance as requiring the acceptance of suffering
sought to undermine the every-present possibility of white paternalism and whites’ ability to
have complete sovereign control to shape black lives. Yet Baldwin’s writings failed to theorize
what acknowledging vulnerability might mean for African Americans. At times, he himself
slipped into a problematic form of racial essentialism and generalization, where he implied that
black culture’s attentiveness to vulnerability through the blues, jazz and spirituals itself enabled
blacks to understand it more deeply than whites.133 More generally, he was strikingly silent about
how recognizing vulnerability might shape African American conceptions of responsibility
towards the black community along the lines of class, sexuality and gender. This myopic focus
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on persuading the white majority reflected a pragmatic-realism that limited the reach of his
insights for blacks.
Freedom, Vulnerability and Politics
It could be argued that a glaring contradiction throughout Baldwin’s writings was the
coexistence of his critique of Americans’ self-perceptions as free and freedom-loving with a call
upon Americans to be free. Yet this apparent paradox is resolved when we understand Baldwin’s
own definition of freedom, based not in unbridled agency but in a more accurate understanding
of reality. He wrote, “[t]he failure to look reality in the face diminishes a nation as it diminishes a
person, and it can only be described as unmanly...human freedom is a complex difficult—and
private—thing. If we can liken life, for a moment, to a furnace, then freedom is the fire which
burns away illusion.”134Baldwin’s invocation of problematic masculine language
notwithstanding, freedom was something that needed to be achieved rather than something
already existing. The core question concerning freedom was not, as the dominant paradigm
suggested, what kind of choices citizens would make. The question was instead whether one was
capable of engaging in the laborious process of eliminating self-delusion. Only when individuals
jettisoned their illusory beliefs would they create a solid foundation from which to live and act.
That freedom required will and desire ensured that it was never a foregone conclusion, easily
achievable with no difficult investment from citizens. This deeply personal matter was
nonetheless a crucial precondition for politics. As he wrote, “I have met only a few people--and
most of these were not Americans--who had any real desire to be free. Freedom is hard to
bear...the political institutions of any nation are always menaced and are ultimately controlled by
the spiritual state of the nation.”135
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Yet that Baldwin’s reconceptualization of freedom depended on knowing truths made it
something that could become too subjective. One could easily reject Baldwin’s understanding of
truth, his selective depiction of reality, in favor of an alternative truth and still be free.
Furthermore, his essays depended upon a speculative assumption that recognizing the reality of
vulnerability would lead American citizens to engage rather than withdraw from struggling for
justice. But such awareness could just as easily make citizens more, rather than less, pessimistic
about changing their ways. That this points to the potential limitations of Baldwin’s arguments
does not diminish their value for explaining why Americans’ ongoing self-perception as
freedom-loving in contemporary American cultural discourse, from the libertarian, right-wing
Tea Party social movement to the liberal reformist, Barack Obama, needs to be undermined for
the sake of racial justice. Dramatizing his own intellectual limitations, Baldwin remained silent
about the kinds of standards would need to govern the future non-racial society he so desperately
called for. Whether its political institutions needed to be social democratic, liberal or radical
democratic was ultimately up to future citizens. As he concluded “In Search of a Majority
(1960),” “the majority for which everyone is seeking which must reassess and release us from
our past and deal with the present and create standards worthy of what a man may be—this
majority is you. No one else can do it.”136
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Chapter 3:
Ralph Ellison’s Reconstruction of Democratic Commitment
Not that it is the novelist’s role to “create the uncreated conscience” of his group or nation, for
that was in motion long ago; rather it is to sensitize the nation’s ever-floundering conscience by
making us conscious of our strengths in our weaknesses and the triumphs of our failures.137
Inspiriting our minds and bodies, they dance in our bones, spurring us to make them ever more
manifest in the structures and processes of ourselves and our society. As a nation, we exist in the
communication of our principles, and we argue over their application and interpretation as over
rights of property or the exercise and sharing of authority…They interrogate us endlessly as to
who and what we are; they demand that we keep the democratic faith.138
-Ralph Ellison
Ellison and Democratic Commitment
Like freedom, Americans have always seen democracy as central to American political culture.
Democracy names an organization of government or society centered on the concept of freedom,
equality and rule of law in which the people are sovereign. Some American political thinkers
have seen democracy as nothing more than a formal-political institution that guarantees citizens
equal participation in free and fair elections, power over representative political institutions and
control over the political agenda.139 Others have seen democracy as measured by citizens’ social
participation, promoted through social egalitarianism, equality of opportunity and freedom from
basic want. Nineteenth-century transcendentalists like Ralph Emerson and Walt Whitman and
twentieth-century progressives like John Dewey defined democracy to mean radical
socioeconomic egalitarianism.140 For their part, political thinkers concerned with racial equality
have always linked the realization of democracy to African American inclusion. The 19th
century abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, explicitly saw the democratic promise of citizens’
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ability to self-govern embedded in the Declaration of Independence as requiring the abolition of
slavery.141 20th century liberals like Gunnar Myrdal and Martin Luther King, Jr. saw it as
incompatible with Jim Crow racial segregation. This incompatibility led them to argue that
democracy required full African American political and socioeconomic participation.142 Today,
contemporary racial justice theorists see the fulfillment of democracy as requiring the abolition
of white-skin privilege that implicitly defines American citizenship,143 social and economic
justice through color-conscious public policies like affirmative action144 and a reformed electoral
system more responsive to the interests of African Americans.145 The core assumption animating
these arguments is that racial justice requires acknowledging democracy’s sublime and
transformative participatory ethos. Since these positive values of democracy call for an
expansion of the polity, whether along purely political or more socioeconomic lines, African
American exclusion becomes unacceptable and requires redress.
Situated within this context, what made Ralph Ellison’s essays and classic novel,
Invisible Man (1952), so unique was that it demonstrated that understanding democracy’s unseen
tragic implications, rather than its positive ideals, was itself crucial for racial justice. First, his
work showed that racial injustice would remain intact insofar as citizens failed to acknowledge
that exercise of democratic autonomy could easily promote self-centered, amoral activity and
that faith in one as an autonomous actor promoted blindness to social obstacles. Second, insofar
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as citizens failed to acknowledge that commitment to democratic equality required those in
power to renounce their privileges. Third, insofar as citizens failed to acknowledge that the
conscientiousness so central to ensuring democratic autonomy and equality helped take attention
away from long-term political strategy. Fourth, insofar as citizens failed to acknowledge the
tremendous effort and ongoing, unending turbulent process of perfection that came from the
transcendental nature of democratic idealism. Ellison’s reformulation of democracy’s
implications, like Baldwin’s critique of freedom, showed that it was not simply a purely utopian,
positive and desirable organization of politics and society but constitutively carried unexpected,
harmful and burdensome consequences. Ellison, unlike Baldwin, nonetheless implied that what
was needed was not dispensing with this core cultural commitment, but greater attentiveness to
its implications or, as he borrowed from his namesake, Ralph Emerson: “conscience,
consciousness, more consciousness and more conscientiousness!”146
By democracy, Ellison meant social freedom, equality and justice that exceeded full
political participation or protection under the law. Insisting that democracy was “the ground-term
of our concept of justice, the basis of our scheme of social rationality, the rock upon which our
society was built,”147 he resisted a narrow construction of democracy as simply a form of
government that was made manifest through representative institutions, fair elections, due
process and various civil liberties. His understanding of “the tragic,” however, was less clear.
Although he used the term throughout his essays, often in conjunction with democracy, he never
defined it. It is thus risky to infer his understanding given that, as Terry Eagleton notes, the term
is popularly understood to mean “very sad” but also invokes elements common to Greek Tragedy
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such as suffering, catastrophe, reversal of fortune, frail heroes and violence.148 The aspect of the
tragic Ellison’s work considered, I suggest, came closest to what his intellectual influence,
Kenneth Burke, understood as the “tragic frame,” marked by the way the human drive toward
perfection would itself be responsible for unintended, unexpected and potentially harmful
consequences.149 Ellison offered a glimpse of this understanding through a revealing
interpretation of Melville’s Moby Dick: “[t]ragedy always involves making the ideal manifest in
the real world...Moby Dick is a tragic story because Ahab is using the resources of technology
and his great courage in a misdirected way. His enemy was not nature but his own wild ambition,
his uncontrollable obsession....”150 A tragic situation, for Ellison, was one in which negative
consequences were inextricably linked to, engendered by and a direct result of action or an idea
seen as irreducibly positive. This point paralleled sociologist George Simmel’s definition that “in
general we call a relationship tragic – in contrast to merely sad or extrinsically destructive –when
the destructive forces directed against some being spring from the deepest levels of that very
being.”151 Emphasizing the tragic nature of commitment to democracy placed Ellison squarely
alongside a tradition of political theorists who have argued that the tragic elements of
contingency, suffering, ambiguity and human frailty, which challenge modern, liberal
conceptions of progress, reason and agency, are constitutive of politics.152 However, for Ellison,
commitment to democracy was not tragic because, as some critics of democracy assert, its moral
utopianism and universalism made it politically impractical or economically inefficient. Not
because it promoted mob rule, threatened individual freedom and the rights of property,
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diminished individual excellence and made for inefficient or thoroughly compromised public
policy.153 One astute interpretation states that Ellison, drawing from Burke’s complex
understanding of the “ritual scapegoat” in the tragic frame, saw the invention of race as
necessary to rationalize the guilt that came from white Americans’ failure to extend democracy
to slaves at the founding.154 This argument is not incorrect but inadequately captures how Ellison
showed that citizens’ commitment to democracy itself was tragic, rather just American
democracy’s historical invention of race.
Ellison’s insights offer a major contribution to contemporary theorizing of racial justice
by showing why it depends as much on citizens’ attentiveness to the unseen paradoxes and
negative implications of democratic commitment as understanding what democracy’s core ideals
are. Recent work on Ellison’s political-theoretical contributions to making a confrontation with
race central to American democratic individualism,155to showing that everyday skin-color both
enables and disables remembering slavery for racial justice156 and to pointing towards a trustgenerating citizenship has overlooked this.157 I argue that attention to this aspect of Ellison’s
work shows theorists why racial justice depends on more than knowledge of whether democracy
is state-sanctioned or a fugitive practice enacted temporarily by citizens, whether it carries a
substantive moral vision or is nothing more than a process, whether it should be majoritarian or
not. Equally crucial is citizens’ attentiveness to how deep commitment to its core values can
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have debilitating repercussions or require them to accept more of a burden than they had
previously understood.
Reconsidering Ellison’s political thought in this way challenges a dominant interpretation
that his patriotic championing of American democratic rhetorics impoverished his theorization of
racial injustice. As Jerry Watts notes, too often such “hegemonic American democratic rhetorics”
diverted Ellison’s attention from diagnosing the pervasive problem of structural racial
inequality.158 Upon first glance, two major pieces of evidence support Watts’ interpretation. First,
Ellison’s assertion that his preoccupation was ultimately not with “injustice, but with art,”159
suggested that, like Baldwin, his art was not specifically concerned with exposing injustice.
Ellison argued that focusing on oppression was a fragile ground for emancipatory action, as
“tears were a betrayal of the struggle for freedom…tears can induce as well as deter action.”160
Second, one could read Ellison’s own defense of and celebration of America, which was
problematically overdetermined and implied contempt for those who were unpatriotic, as
threatening to his own critical reflections. Ellison, unlike Baldwin, argued that a core
responsibility of the African American writer was to illuminate the moral character of American
democratic identity. This project was driven by cultivating hope in readers by recovering
strength from weakness and hope from despair, to “sensitize the nation’s ever-floundering
conscience by making us conscious of our strengths in our weaknesses and the triumphs in our
failures.”161 Yet this decidedly nationalistic project, bent on making vivid whatever moral content
lay beneath the sedimentations of immoral American practices was infinitely more complex than
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Watts acknowledges. First, Watts overlooks that Ellison was deeply attentive to racial injustice
throughout his writings. One of his earliest essays, “American Dilemma: A Review”(1949),
written before the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) U.S. Supreme Court decision rendered
school segregation unconstitutional, argued that Gunnar Myrdal’s depiction of blacks as
culturally pathological could confirm harmful racial stereotypes that would keep white racism
intact. One of his later speeches, “Address to the Harvard College Alumni, Class of 1949” (1974)
claimed that post-Civil Rights African American opportunities were stifled by concerted
strategies that went beyond political disenfranchisement or unequal treatment by the law.
Ellison’s optimism that the Civil Rights movement aligned American society more closely with
the ideals of the Constitution and Bill of Rights was chastened by a sober recognition that white
resistance to affirmative action programs and to public school desegregation threatened to make
racial equality stillborn. As he wrote, “[n]orthern whites have reacted to the pressures of black
northerners for more equality as vehemently and in some cases as violently and irrationally as
their southern counterparts.”162 Second, Watts overlooks how Ellison’s patriotism was at odds
with his work’s critique and radicalization of democracy Its critique of how democratic
autonomy and conscientiousness carried the very ingredients for its undoing challenged romantic
positions that saw it as uncomplicated or purely positive. Its radicalization of democratic equality
and the ideal of democratic commitment challenged positions that saw democracy as easily
realizable. Such decidedly unorthodox insights resisted ideological characterization as liberal,
conservative or socialist and rendered fictitious the ideology of progress and triumphalism upon
which conventional American patriotic rhetorics subsisted. Understanding this point complicates
interpretations that see Ellison as nothing more than a Cold War liberal, whose work tried to
reaffirm the hegemony of American moral exceptionalism against the threat of Soviet
162
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Communism163 or issue cultural criticisms of racial liberalism’s unexamined denigration of black
culture.164 The theory that emerged from his work challenged thinkers like Myrdal and Johnson
who invoked democracy to convince a white audience to respond to racial injustice. Not only
was his work directed across the color line but it sought to heighten sensitivity to democracy’s
complex, dark nature and unseen logic. Ellison’s exegesis and exposition of this amounted to a
kind of consciousness-raising, which aligned closely with his conception of art’s radical
potential. This potential came not from its aesthetic beauty but from dialectically locating truth
within falsehood and falsehood within truth. Art was at its best, he explained, when it could
“challenge the apparent forms of reality—that is, the fixed manners and values of the few—and
to struggle with it until it reveals its mad, vari-implicated chaos, its false faces, and on until it
surrenders its insight, its truth.”165
The final contribution of this chapter is a fresh interpretation of Invisible Man’s core
political insights. Invisible Man chronicles the turbulent life of an unnamed African American
man who struggles to become a conscious actor in a world marked by white supremacy. Invisible
Man moves south to north, from a student in an all-black college to the Harlem district organizer
of an organization, the Brotherhood, which is committed to the idea of social equality for all
citizens. This moves him from a state of naïve optimism, to one of disenchantment and
pessimism; from a position of darkness where he believes his invisibility can be overcome, to
one where he finally recognizes his fate. This has led critics to argue that the novel provides
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crucial insights into the possibility of freedom under conditions of constraint166 and the role of
sacrifice for citizenship.167 This examination is central to the novel, but something is lost if we
overlook how it also theorized the way citizens’ ability to successfully confront racial inequality
could be shaped by their understanding of democracy. Ellison himself never offered irrefutable
evidence that any of the novel’s characters were consciously committed to democracy: indeed,
the word “democratic” is only invoked once throughout it.168 However, there are two major
sources of evidence to support reading the novel in this way. First, that the novel’s chief internal
conflict, Invisible Man’s confusion about his grandfather’s treacherous last words to “overcome
‘em with yeses, undermining ‘em with grins, agree ‘em to death and destruction,” 169 resolves
with a recognition that it was based upon the need “to affirm the principle on which the country
was built.”170 This provides space to read Invisible Man’s own intellectual journey as a
confrontation with democracy: the faith in autonomy, the desire for social equality and the
practice of conscientiousness that Ellison argued was central to democracy. Second, Ellison’s
hope that Invisible Man would keep Americans on track to fulfill the democratic ideal. He wrote
that he crafted the novel “as a raft of hope, perception and entertainment that might help keep us
afloat as we [try] to negotiate the snags and whirlpools that mark our nation’s vacillating course
toward and away from the democratic ideal.”171
Autonomy and Debilitation
Ellison’s centralization of autonomy to democracy challenged a prevailing idea that democratic
self-rule strictly meant negative freedom from government interference into individual’s choices.
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This followed from his understanding that democracy was a social rather than simply political
ideal, centered on creating an open society where individuals were encouraged to achieve their
own potential without the fetters of tradition, to transverse social boundaries and to reinvent
themselves. A democratic society, for Ellison was an “open society in which the individual could
achieve his potential unhindered by his ties to the past…[and in which] social categories are
open, and the individual is not only considered capable of transforming himself, but is
encouraged to do so.”172 Arguing that democracy encouraged an art of individualistic selfmaking, improvisation and perfection put Ellison squarely in a tradition of American democratic
individualism, exemplified by Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman.173 For Ellison,
autonomy was not protection from government but individuals’ pursuit of their own posited
conceptions of perfection beyond adhering to the rule of law or acquiring property. He noted that
the “democratic process” allowed individuals “to move about, to change their identities if they
would, to advance themselves, to achieve results based on their own talents and techniques.”174
Emphasizing this part of Ellison’s conception of self-rule might simply challenge assertions that
he was a mainstream liberal.175 Yet closer inspection reveals that Invisible Man provided a
unique angle from which to demonstrate the tragic implications of autonomy. A standard
contemporary argument is that the individualist call for personal responsibility, hard work and
self-reliance associated with autonomy is one crucial factor for nullifying strong claims for

172

Ellison, “The Little Man at Chehaw Station,” 503.
Walt Whitman, Democratic Vistas (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2010); Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature
and Selected Essays, Penguin Classics (New York: Penguin, 2003).
174
Ellison, “The Novel as a Function of American Democracy” (1967), 757.
175
It is true that Ellison himself never adequately distanced himself from Bledsoe throughout his writings or
criticized the now too-familiar conservative understanding of freedom as personal responsibility, which calls for
personal responsibility without any social or governmental interference. Perhaps this failure had to do with the fact
that the equation of democratic commitment with rugged-individualism only become manifest after Ellison’s public
influence, in the early 1980s with the rise of Ronald Reagan. For this reading, see Hortense J. Spillers, “‘The Little
Man at Chehaw’ Today,” Boundary 2, 30:2, 5-19.
173

65

socioeconomic redistribution necessary for racial equality.176 The idea of self-rule, in other
words, authorizes resistance to government intervention. Ellison identified that the problem with
the exercise of autonomy is instead that the power it crucially provides marginalized African
Americans to personally control their life chances is also what could be responsible for harming
others and themselves.
The clearest exposition of this came through Invisible Man’s encounter with Dr. Bledsoe,
the president of the all-black college he attends. In what becomes a formative moment for him,
Bledsoe expels Invisible Man for showing an influential white donor, Mr. Norton, the poor black
outskirts that surround it. After Invisible Man protests his expulsion, Bledsoe tells him that he
himself does not need to offer a justification for his decision because, through his own effort, he
controls the school:
[t]he white folk tell everybody what to think--except men like me. I tell them; that’s my
life, telling white folk how to think about the things I know about...It’s a nasty deal
and I don’t always like it myself. But you listen to me: I didn’t make it, and I know that I
can’t change it. But I’ve made my place in it and I’ll have every Negro in this country
hanging on tree limbs by morning if it means staying where I am.177
Originating not from some primordial human self-interest or a lack of moral sense, but from a
haphazard, improvisation upon distorted social circumstances, Ellison showed that Bledsoe’s
exercise of personal autonomy to expel Invisible Man was not tragic, as critics from Plato in The
Republic to James Madison in Federalist 10 insisted, because it allowed him to enact his darkest
desires, pleasures and interests without any regard for order, stability or the common good.178 He
instead captured how it was tragic because its centrality for helping him navigate his own destiny
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was itself responsible for harming Invisible Man. On the one hand, Ellison showed the positive
value autonomy offers marginalized citizens to shape their destiny. First, insofar as autonomy
does not provide a substantive vision of how anyone should act but only enables them to
personally improvise in a world that is decidedly distorted and non-ideal, racially marginalized
citizens are free to devise the means to achieve their happiness. This constitutive emptiness of
autonomy made it incredibly flexible, subject to creative improvisation and renegotiation, which
provided endless possibilities for acting. Second, autonomy provides these citizens the individual
power to secure their happiness in a society fundamentally distorted by white supremacy. Power
becomes vested in the citizen, rather than the state or others; one’s mind, energy and decisions
become the determining factors for restructuring their life. Bledsoe’s understanding that
expelling Invisible Man would enable him to protect his status within the black college as well as
the college thus exceeds simple ruthlessness. Exercising his autonomy is an outcome of a deeply
flawed perception of an already distorted reality, but nonetheless exemplifies Bledsoe’s own,
partial devising of a life strategy to achieve personal happiness without any direct guidance of
what secures it. Him telling Invisible Man to be a “fighter”179 and that he should “accept
responsibility” for his act and “avoid becoming bitter,”180 reflects not simply a conservative or
strategically misleading understanding of personal responsibility but his own, chosen account of
the good, a personal maxim to live by, which he genuinely believes would enable Invisible Man
to become in charge of his destiny. On the other hand, Ellison implies how the constitutive
emptiness and open-ended nature of autonomy offers no intrinsic justification to act morally
towards others. Furthermore, the self-centeredness of autonomy is what can lead to outcomes
that prevent others from exercising it. Bledsoe’s exercise of autonomy, his personal, improvised
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and amoral choice to expel Invisible Man as a way to secure his status is precisely what denies
Invisible Man an education.
Not only was the exercise of autonomy potentially tragic, but Ellison also showed that so
too was deep faith in its possibility. This faith promoted the hubristic belief that one’s destiny
could be shaped through individual dedication, which blinded one to their limitations. Deep
admiration for Bledsoe is the force behind Invisible Man’s individual resilience. This becomes
clear when he tells a potential white employer, Mr. Emerson, that, “...I guess I’d like to become
Dr. Bledsoe’s assistant,” and in response to Emerson’s claim that this was ambitious, “I guess I
am, sir. But I’m willing to work hard.”181 It would be mistaken to trivialize Invisible Man’s faith
in his autonomy, as Ellison shows that it provides him the requisite energy to vigorously seek out
work up North rather than remain destitute in the South. Yet this faith is also what blinds
Invisible Man to real obstacles that thwart him from single-handedly taking charge of his
destiny. Emerson himself warns Invisible Man that “[t]he only trouble with ambition is that it
sometimes blinds one to realities.”182 These obstacles soon become clear after Emerson shows
that Bledsoe’s letters of introduction to prospective white employers were nothing more than
denunciations of Invisible Man.183 Social obstacles beyond his control govern his fate, doubly
illustrating the limited power of his self-rule to achieve happiness as well the impossibility of
him to genuinely exercise it. Yet deep faith is what blinds him to the white employers and
powerful black leaders who secure their own power and make it impossible for him to truly be
autonomous. This is lost on Invisible Man. His lack of consciousness is precisely what helps
secure his racial marginalization.
Equality as Vulnerability
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No less than freedom, Ellison argued that equality was central to democracy. At times, he offered
a liberal definition of equality that meant equality of opportunity. He asserted that the framers
“committed us to a system which would guarantee all of its citizens equality of opportunity.”184
At others, he gestured towards a more social-democratic understanding that meant equality of
results. Often buried in many of his essays, this social-democratic definition would become
apparent in a 1990 Columbia University address. Ellison, reflecting on his walk along Riverside
Drive in uptown New York City where he saw visible structural social inequality in the form of
“the homeless, young drug hustlers and addicts who make use of the benches on Riverside
Drive,” suggested "The Declaration is the moral imperative to which all of us, black and white,
are committed...our history has also been marked by endless attempts to evade our moral
commitment to the ideal of social equality.”185 Ellison’s reading of homelessness, drug dealing
and drug addiction as a deviation from the Declaration of Independence’s ideal of social equality
revised racial inequality as a collective social failure in need of remediation and radicalized the
Declaration of Independence’s call for equality to exceed equal political rights. Yet debates
mired over whether Ellison was a liberal, social democrat or conservative miss a larger, more
poignant point about his understanding of equality. 186 One of his most direct meditations
suggested that racial injustice would remain firmly intact if white Americans were unable to
acknowledge that equality’s radical call for social transformation required them to remain
attentive to and fight against their own power and privilege. Ellison explained this thesis through
a revised account of the American founding in “Perspective of Literature” (1977):
At Philadelphia, the Founding Fathers were presented the fleeting opportunity of
mounting the very peak of social possibility afforded by democracy. But after ascending
184
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to within a few yards of the summit they paused, finding the view to be one combining
splendor with terror. From this height of human aspiration the ethical implications of
democratic equality were revealed as tragic, for if there was radiance and glory in the
future that stretched so grandly before them, there was also mystery and turbulence and
darkness astir in its depths. Therefore the final climb would require not only courage, but
an acceptance of the tragic nature of their enterprise and the adoption of a tragic attitude
that was rendered unacceptable by the optimism developed in revolutionary struggle, no
less than by the tempting and virginal richness of the land which was now rendered
accessible. So having climbed so heroically, they descended and laid a foundation for
democracy at a less breathtaking altitude, and in justification of their failure of nerve
before the challenge of the summit, the Founding fathers committed the sin of American
racial pride.187
Ellison’s formulation, unlike Baldwin’s, which centralized alienation, anxiety and fear as
undermining Americans’ freedom at the American founding, strikingly rendered the radical
principle of democratic equality responsibly for anxiety. Anxiety came from a moral
commitment central to American political culture, rather than something peripheral to it.
Ellison’s narrative of the American founding ironically offered a much stronger indictment of
American culture than Baldwin’s because it refused to make anxiety independent of its moral
radicalism. Its exceptionalism came from the fact that the sublime sense of social and moral
possibility so intrinsic to equality itself engendered terror that would compel citizens to
constantly violate it. Yet embedded in Ellison’s reading was also a much more radical account of
equality. For Ellison, democratic equality was not tragic simply tragic because, as conservatives
would suggest, it threatened individual freedom188 or because, as Friedrich Nietzsche worried, it
stifled individual excellence and creativity.189 Instead, it was tragic because to give the demos
equal power entailed following through with the consequences that issued from it, no matter the
costs. To grant all citizens this power would always threaten to revolutionize reality, engender
187
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great unpredictability and compel the powerful white majority to willingly risk the social and
psychological privileges white-skin afforded them. Yet Ellison’s reframing of equality also
offered a unique critique of racial injustice. A traditional critique of American racial injustice is
that white Americans simply failed to extend equality to African Americans or that this failure
itself rendered fictitious Americans’ commitment to equality. The problem, this argument
assumes, was that either equality was only ever realized for whites rather than for all or that this
lack of universalization showed its absence.190 For Ellison, failing to unequivocally accept an
unpredictable future that could perpetually threaten their status, resources and security, what
Ellison described as a “tragic attitude,” was what kept racial injustice intact. It not only allowed
for the continued the existence of slavery but also occasioned the need for racial categories. Yet
race, which allowed whites to rationalize their unwillingness to become vulnerable, itself
provided the justification for reserving equality to whites and helped whitewash the tragic
essence of equality from American consciousness. African American inclusion became a
political nonstarter as African Americans were seen as subhuman, “ignorant, cowardly, thieving,
lying, hypocritical and superstitious in their religious beliefs and practices, morally loose,
drunken, filthy of personal habit, sexually animalisitic, crude and disgusting in their public
content, and aesthetically just plain unpleasant.”191
Invisible Man contextualized this argument by juxtaposing it against a standard
understanding of what makes equality tragic, which sees its institutionalization as requiring a
strategic compromise of its idealism. This became evident during Invisible Man’s encounter with
Hambro, a white member of the Brotherhood member, who tells him that his Harlem district’s
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interests need to be sacrificed for the interests of the whole. He says, “your members will have to
be sacrificed…we are making temporary alliances with other political groups and the interests of
one group of brothers must be sacrificed to that of the whole.”192 Danielle Allen’s astute reading
of this dialogue as shedding insight into the role of sacrifice for citizenship overlooks how it
shows how one understanding of equality’s tragic essence obscures another one.193
Understanding a crucial link between equality and sacrifice, Hambro imagines democratic
equality as requiring one group’s need for social equality to be temporarily delayed for the sake
of strategic political concerns and temporary political alliances. Equality is tragic, on this
interpretation, because of the tension between its pure ideal and the impure tactics crucial for its
realization. Furthermore, equality is tragic because its realization and institutionalization in an
imperfect power-saturated world requires decidedly inegalitarian tactics or unequal sacrifice. Yet
Invisible Man contends that Hambro’s interpretation of democratic equality’s tragic essence
obscures the fact that equality requires sacrifice for those in power. African Americans, he says,
are merely “demanding equality of sacrifice...we’ve never asked for special treatment...so the
weak must sacrifice for the strong?”194 Invisible Man’s critique demonstrates that understanding
equality as tragic because it requires sacrifice from the weak is dubious because it ignores and
helps ignore how the powerful are not ethically powerless and unequal to the weak. At the same
time, abandoning those who are unequal and asking them to accept more inequality violates
equality’s moral core. Accordingly, Invisible implies that social equality demands sacrifice of the
Brotherhood’s former strategy towards African Americans, to devise new tactics and strategies
to better adjust to their obstacles. Social equality demands Hambro’s sacrifice of his white
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American privilege to make paternalistic decisions on behalf of African Americans rather than
the compromise of African Americans to have equal voice in collective decision-making.
Acceptable sacrifice must always include the strong rather than simply the weak. Sacrifice must
instead be enacted by those like the Brotherhood and many of its white members who stand to
benefit most from existing social hierarchies. Hambro’s blindness to this enables the
Brotherhood’s withdrawal from Harlem and reinforces the existence of his white privilege.
Hambro tells Invisible Man that the abandonment of Harlem residents is for “their own good.”195
The Limits of Conscientiousness
For Ellison, central to the realization of autonomy and equality was a conscientious concern for
concrete individuals beyond one’s immediate family or group. Political scientists have long
argued that democracy depends on a vibrant civil sphere. This pre-political realm of social life
was where, Tocqueville argued, citizens could refine their habits of thoughtful citizenship and
thwart the state’s monopolization of public opinion.196 For Robert Putnam, robust civic
engagement promoted robust political participation.197 What Ellison centralized instead was that
conscientiousness that exceeded civic concern for the institutions of a democratic system of
government, or what he described as the “conscious and conscientious concern for others…
[which was] the essence of the American ideal,”198 was crucial for maintaining democracy. He
understood this concern as decidedly selfless and preoccupied with others’ well being. At some
moments, Ellison spoke about this conscientiousness as love, which he believed was
interchangeable with democracy. As he once put it, “the way home we seek is that condition of
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man’s being in the world, which is called love, and which we term democracy.”199 These
sporadic, largely disconnected reflections on conscientiousness frustrate a substantive
interpretation of its role in Ellison’s political thought, but some important insight is found in
Invisible Man. Jack Turner correctly asserts that the closest emulation of disinterested love’s
significance for democracy is found in Invisible Man’s grandfather’s agape, his loving of nonspecific neighbors and enemies.200 But Turner inadequately considers that the novel also
explored the tragic nature of interested concern for specific others so crucial for democracy.
Addressing racial inequality would be increasingly difficult if citizens ignored that the
conscientious concern for concrete others was alone an inadequate foundation for and sometimes
at odds with devising long-term strategy or strategic coalitions so necessary for political action.
Ellison makes this point clear through Invisible Man’s arrival to Harlem, when he comes
across an elderly black couple being evicted from their home. He identifies the power of
sympathy for social equality, as the sight of the couple crying, along with their accumulated
objects, sprawled across the sidewalk, transforms Invisible Man from a passive observer into an
active participant. He wants to leave, but can’t because he feels himself becoming “too much a
part of it to leave.”201 Ellison’s observation sides with Baldwin’s valorization of compassion for
racial justice, but also excavates its counterproductive consequences. Invisible Man’s shifting
tactics meant to appease the restless crowd emerging before him to protest the couple’s eviction
demonstrates how care shifts the focus on directly responding to others rather than upon a
concrete strategy for resisting larger scale structural racial oppression. Ellison describes how
these shifting tactics are partly caused by him being moved emotionally, “rapidly without
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thought but out of my clashing emotions.”202 He first begins by suggesting that the black crowd
abide by the law and accept the eviction, an obvious riff on Booker T. Washington’s
conservative idea that African Americans ought to improve relations with whites rather than
fight for social equality.203 After the crowd assaults the officer he begins encouraging it to be
law-abiding to a higher law (presumably social equality or equal dignity) that would make the
eviction itself unacceptable. Invisible Man subversively interprets law-abiding to mean cleaning
up the couple’s possessions: “take it, hide that junk! Put it back where it came from. It’s
blocking the street and the sidewalk, and that’s against the law.”204 Yet Ellison makes the limits
of this conscientiousness clear. Just as the crowd feels a sense of empowerment, someone from it
yells “[w]e’re citizens. We go anywhere we like,”205 the police officers quickly call for back up,
arbitrarily designating the crowd’s actions as constituting a riot and reinstating the power of the
law backed by state power. That Invisible Man’s care delays eviction and inspires in the crowd a
sense of collective political efficacy but neither advances a clear set of demands nor a concerted
strategy that builds towards a larger policy goal such as fair housing or better relations between
the community and police shows its centrality but limitation for racial justice. A widespread
understanding among scholars is that sympathy, love and care are crucial preconditions for
justice, as they draw citizens to identify with others in ways that exceed the law or political
institutions.206 Ellison’s illustration confirms but offers a sympathetic critique of this argument
by showing that care, especially at a phenomenological, interpersonal level, is radically distinct
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from and often shifts focus away from political strategy, which is less concerned with concrete
others and based on means-ends logic. To sympathize is to feel, acknowledge and recognize
others’ pain, rather than to construct strategies about what to do about it in the future. To fail to
recognize these limitations, Ellison shows, makes it more difficult to strategize against state
power, as the officers’ ability to unilaterally redefine the protest into a riot makes sympathy
alone insufficient for change. The abrupt conclusion, which shows Invisible Man fleeing the
scene, makes obvious that when this happens the law of power and power’s law get the last
word.
Another instance where Ellison theorizes how failure to understand conscientiousness’
tragic outcomes is during Invisible Man’s defense of his decision to orchestrate a public funeral
for Tod Clifton, a former black Brotherhood member killed by police officers. What he shows is
that the personal origins of conscientiousness are often at odds with the impersonal goal of social
equality for all. Invisible Man’s organization of the protest is an exercise in personal
responsibility not driven by any strategic or tactical goals. It is instead based on a conscientious
concern to commemorate a human yet racialized life unjustly killed by the state: “[h]e was a man
and a Negro; a man and a traitor, as you say; [but] he was a dead man...we dramatized the
shooting down of an unarmed black man...Isn’t the shooting of an unarmed man of more
importance politically than the fact that he sold obscene dolls?”207 Without question, the
Brotherhood’s critique of Invisible Man’s decision itself reflects a self-interested desire to
preserve their organizational interests rather than strictly their professed concern for social
equality. For them, Clifton becomes unworthy of a proper burial because his politically
counterproductive selling of Sambo dolls constitutes a form a treason to the movement. Yet the
Brotherhood’s sarcastic critique of Invisible Man as the “the great tactician of personal
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responsibility”208 and their critically asking of him, “[s]ooo! Is that all the great tactician has to
tell us...In what direction were they moved?,”209 identifies how dependence upon one’s own
sense of what is right can be anti-democratic because it stands in opposition to the will of fellow
citizens. Furthermore, this critique exposes a deeper tension between the personalized feeling of
sympathy and the more detached concern for specific political outcomes. That Invisible Man first
responds by saying “[t]hey were aroused. That was all we could do,”210 and later claims that it
“gave them the opportunity to express their feelings, to affirm themselves,”211 indicates his own
admission that his exercise in personal responsibility has no developed political strategy and the
protest simply allowed citizens to positively affirm their feelings. Invisible Man refuses to
acknowledge the Brotherhood’s astute critique, conflating it instead with the organization’s
latent racism. Yet his attempt to subversion the Brotherhood with strategic affirmation, “I’d
overcome them with yeses, undermine them with grins, I’d agree them to death and
destruction,”212 carries no affirmative political value at the level of concerted political strategy.
All this occurs while Harlem continues to unravel into greater poverty and social unrest.
Spiritualism and the Impossibility of Democracy
The above reflections confirm Ellison’s understanding that the practice of democracy resembled
a jazz-like process of improvisation, filled with unexpected possibilities as well as unimagined
failures. 213 Yet this point itself followed from what Ellison believed was a much larger tragic
truth about democratic idealism. The tragic implication of democratic commitment was not
simply that the substantive ideals of democratic autonomy and equality unleashed difficult,
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sometimes counterproductive effects, but that the spiritualism, transcendentalism and universal
aspiration of these ideals made their realization something that was fundamentally ongoing and
impossible to fully complete. Ellison clarified this striking point in one of his most famous
meditations on democracy, “Little Man at Chehaw Station” (1978):
The rock, the terrain upon which we struggle, is itself abstract, a terrain of ideas that,
man-made, exerts the compelling force of the ideal, of the sublime...For while we are but
human and thus given to the fears and temptations of the flesh, we are dedicated to
principles that are abstract, ideal, spiritual: principles that were conceived linguistically
and committed to paper during the contention over political ideals and economic interests
which was released and given focus during the period of our revolutionary break with
tradition forms of society, principles that were enshrined--again linguistically--in the
document of state upon which this nation was founded...these principles--democracy,
equality, individual freedom and universal justice--now move us as articles of faith.
Holding them sacred, we act (or fail to act) in their names. And in the freewheeling
fashion of words that are summoned up to name the ideal, they prod us ceaselessly
toward the refinement and perfection of those formulations of policy and configurations
of social forms of which they are signs and symbols. As we strive to conduct social
action in accordance with the ideals they evoke, they in turn insist upon being made flesh.
Inspiriting our minds and bodies, they dance in our bones, spurring us to make them ever
more manifest in the structures and processes of ourselves and our society. As a nation,
we exist in the communication of our principles, and we argue over their application and
interpretation as over rights of property or the exercise and sharing of authority…They
interrogate us endlessly as to who and what we are; they demand that we keep the
democratic faith.214
Ellison’s rehashing of Louis Hartz’s thesis that liberalism was the core tradition in American
political culture departed from Baldwin.215 For Ellison, unlike Baldwin, such democratic
principles continued to inform the nature of political discourse because they were so deeply
entrenched in the national vocabulary. Yet this optimistic depiction coexisted with a
reformulation of democracy itself. At the most basic level, Ellison reframed democracy as a
word, an idea rather than an incontestable fact: America’s founding democratic principles were
nothing more than performative utterances that did not uncover something true about what
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already exists but tried to assert it into being.216 That these principles were outcomes of human
imagination thus made clear that their existence was far from certain. At a deeper level, Ellison’s
reformulation of the democracy as an abstract ideal rather than definite practice emphasize its
opposition to the human corporeal world. This opposition highlighted how the ideal of
democracy could always negate, challenge and transform extant realities but also was primarily
an ideal. The ideal of democracy would thus never be purely or fully realized because no
reformist public policy or legislation could account for its non-corporeal, transcendent and
spiritual quality. Any concrete measure of inherently imperfect housing, welfare of health policy
could be called “democratic” rather than oligarchic because it promoted popular interests but it
could never fully capture democracy’s immeasurable idealism.
Ellison’s narrative thus challenged the belief that democracy was something that could
simply be achieved through political processes, social or economic policies that enhanced
freedom and equality. Yet he identified an aspect of democracy’s fugitive nature that differed
from Sheldon Wolin. Whereas Wolin understood democracy as an ephemeral moment of
citizens’ collective collaboration decoupled from elections or more generally statist practices,
Ellison showed that democracy’s fundamental idealism, much closer to a Platonic form, an ever
fleeting horizon, made it impossible to be fully complete in the world.217 From a different angle,
Ellison identified a dimension of democracy’s constitutive futurity that Jacques Derrida
overlooked. Derrida’s deconstruction of democracy identified how the conceptual, logical
contradictions of democracy between, for example, freedom and equality and multiplicity and
sovereignty, made democracy impure, self-sabotaging. Since democracy could never fully exist,
its closest approximation occurred through citizens’ attentiveness to these constitutive
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contradictions.218 At the general level, Ellison’s foregrounding of democracy’s tragic, selfsabotaging implications of autonomy, equality and conscientiousness did anticipate Derrida’s
immanent critique of democracy. Yet, unlike Derrida’s, his point was less about its constitutive
aporias and more about the gap between its idealism and practice. Still, much like Derrida’s call
for seeing democracy as something that was in the constant future tense, a “to come” made
centralized the need for citizens to be vigilant, Ellison’s narrative about democracy also implied
that democratic responsibility was an almost unbearable, Sisyphean task, depending entirely
upon frail, all too-human citizens. That it was an idea rather than a reality required citizens to
engage in an unending process of working to instantiate it in their politics and lives. Genuine
responsibility to democracy thus required burdensome vigilance and a willingness to commit
oneself to call for its existence in the most difficult and unpleasant times, even if it was not
politically expedient or economically viable.
Ellison asserted that this tragic knowledge that democracy was about perfection was kept
afloat in American consciousness through African Americans’ historical denial of and struggle
for inclusion. As he once put it, “without the presence of blacks... [absent] would be the need for
that tragic knowledge which we ceaselessly try to evade: the true subject of democracy is not
simply material well-being, but the extension of the democratic process in the direction of
perfecting itself. And the most obvious clue and test for that perfection is the inclusion, not
assimilation, of the black man.”219 First, the idea that democracy was primarily about the
turbulent process of collective, social transformation rather than the more stable, individualistic
activity of maintaining middle-class standards of living, was kept alive through African
American exclusion. Second, its spiritualism and radicalism were kept alive through African
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American citizens and social movements’ insistence that it be realized in American life. Third, it
was African American inclusion that served as a barometer of democracy in America. In a 1972
commencement address at the College of William and Mary, Ellison, as a representative of the
excluded African American minority, sought to challenge the post- Civil Right era’s racially
unequal moment, which he believed was nothing more than a continuation of the failure of the
Founding and Civil War generations to create a racially just society. American democracy
required constant extension and perfection in American cities, education and neighborhoods. As
he put it, “the state of the world into which you are about to enter isn’t just a matter of laws. It is
also a matter of the spiritual quality of our American principles and how they infuse not only our
words and our laws, but the arrangement of our cities, the quality of our education and the
disposition of our neighborhoods.”220 Serious commitment to democracy would not only require
white and black Americans to collaborate together, but accept the unpleasant and unsettling fact
that racial justice would never be fully achieved. Democracy’s sacredness made it irreducible to
so-called democratic-egalitarian legislation of the 1960s or equal political participation for
African Americans. Its sacredness required more racially integrated cities, more and better
quality education, more respectful and generous conversations between white and black citizens
and more solidarity. To more effectively realize autonomy and equality, even if it could never be
fully realized, meant ongoing effort rather than passivity, more risk and perpetual sacrifice. Only
this realization, Ellison insisted, could make for a racially just society. Yet during the late 1970s
such knowledge was absent. At the conclusion of “Perspective on Literature” (1977) Ellison
wrote,
But I think something else should be said, since much of the atmosphere of our time is
created by major transformations in the our way of looking at the law and at the racial
aspects of the law, going back to 1954 and up the measures passed in the sixties.
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We went about that with a feeling of good intentions. We sacrificed. We did much to
rectify past injustices. But then, with our usual American innocence, we failed to grasp
that it was going to cost us something in terms of personal sacrifices and in the
rearrangement of the cities and the suburbs. It would cost us something in terms of the
sheer acceleration of turmoil and conflict. And so, we have become a bit tired of this old
business.221
Using a racially ambiguous “we,” reminiscent of Baldwin’s invocation of white and black
Americans, Ellison, unlike Baldwin, cast the then racial unequal present as originating in
Americans’ unwillingness in the unending, ongoing self and collective work in all realms of life,
rather than a self-perception of free and freedom-loving. White Americans were unwilling to
accept more and ever-greater sacrifices like the rearrangement of cities and neighborhoods,
which went beyond granting African Americans legal equal voting rights or equal protection
under the law. Some black Americans were also unwilling to accept that democracy could not be
instantiated through racial separatism but instead required acceptance of the psychological and
social costs of racial integration.222 This cross-racial, collective abdication of democratic
responsibility was made easier, as Ellison would explain one year later in “Little Man at Chehaw
Station,” through the revival of ethnic identity. White and black Americans’ belief that their
responsibility was primarily to their ethnic group, rather than society as a whole, to each other
and the ideal of democracy itself, left unfulfilled the rich possibilities of democracy. As he wrote,
“the newly fashionable code word ‘ethnicity’... [is] circulated to sanction the abandonment of
policies and the degrading of ideas. So today, before the glaring inequities, unfulfilled promises
and rich possibilities of democracy, we hear heady evocations of European, African and Asian
backgrounds accompanied by chants proclaiming the inviolability of ancestral blood.”223
Ethnicity made democracy stillborn by stabilizing a chaotic, turbulent existence. Ethnicity’s
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centralization of the body and blood over ideal, history over potentiality, the particular over the
universal, what was most immediate over what was abstract, diminished potential for collective
action. To reverse this Americans needed to paradoxically accept a burden that was impossible to
carry, to continue an ongoing struggle with no end in sight.
Ellison, Patriotism and Comedy
That Ellison’s work actually raised serious questions about whether democracy itself was a
viable institution made this championing of American democracy intellectual questionable.
Furthermore, he himself seemed to overtly question his own democratic faith when he wrote that
the essence of the “terrible” in American life could not be localized to race because in “so much
of American life which lies beyond the Negro community [there lies] the very essence of the
terrible.”224 Yet Ellison continued to champion American democratic values precisely at a Cold
War moment when these values were being used to reinforce American fears against
communism and silence critical dissent.
Ellison’s own problematic patriotism should not simply be disavowed, but to make it the
basis for ad hominem critiques misses a larger theoretical point about American political culture
and political action. Accusations that his patriotism illuminated that Ellison was singularly
obsessed with recognition, status and concern with participating in a monumental tradition of
American intellectual life miss his critical awareness that liberal hegemonic rhetorics, for better
or worse, were crucial for shaping American politics. Writers, Ellison believed, were charged
with the responsibility of "creating and broadening our consciousness of American character, of
creating and re-creating the American experience...because it is our good-and-bad fortune that
we Americans exist at our best only when we are conscious of who we are and where we are
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going...”225 Following theorists of American political culture like Alexis De Tocqueville, Sacvan
Bercovitch and Louis Hartz, Ellison himself understood the ideological limitations of American
political culture.226 We can thus read his glorification of American democracy, reminiscent of
Walt Whitman’s depiction of America and democracy as convertible terms, 227 as reflecting a
belief that Americans were unable to conceptualize national reinvention without it.
Understanding this also contextualizes Ellison’s perplexing claim that the task of
“surviving” the pain and making “sense of American experience” required that it be viewed “the
wry perspective of sanity-saving comedy.”228 At first glance, comedy is a problematic, if not
completely futile, way to understand the American experience that only promotes patriotism:
comedy deploys humor to elicit laughter, whereas the American experience seems to be marked
by the horrors of racial violence and exploitation and so requires tears; comedy depicts a happy
resolution of tense conflict, whereas the American experience seems to be marked by seemingly
irresolvable conflicts and deep wounds that can never be sutured. Yet Ellison’s subversive call
for comedy itself cast the American experience, much like democracy itself, as ambiguous,
contradictory, perplexing and disjointed, which itself resisted seriousness and romance, the genre
most often associated with patriotism. That laughter rather than tears was most effective for
resilience constitutes Ellison’s subjective understanding of what energizes human endurance. But
his call for understanding the American experience comically sought to play on Americans’
patriotism but disrupt their conviction that they understood what their country was all about.
Ellison’s project of consciousness-raising, like Baldwin’s, was partial, itself nothing more
than a product of what he believed was the process in which minorities struggled with “the major
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group’s attempt to impose its ideal upon the rest, insisting that its exclusive image be accepted as
the image of the American.”229 This struggle would need to be continued by citizens in the
future: “despite the impact of the American idea upon the world, the “American” himself has
not…been finally defined.”230 A new, future American majority would be charged with the task
of advancing an account at once more persuasive, imaginative and democratically serviceable.
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Chapter 4:
Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Generosity and Racial Justice
I think long and carefully about what my novels ought to do. They should clarify the roles that
have become obscured; they ought to identify those things in the past that are useful and those
things that are not; and they ought to give nourishment…My work bears witness and suggests
who the outlaws are, who survived under what circumstances and why, what was legal in the
community as opposed to what was legal outside it.231
But I think that I still write about the same thing, which is how people relate to one another and
miss it or hang on it…or are tenacious about love. About love and how to survive—not to make a
living—but how to survive whole in a world where we are all of us, in some measure, victims of
something.232
-Toni Morrison
American Political Culture, Generosity and Beloved
As with freedom and democracy, the idea that Americans are committed to generosity is a
crucial part of American culture. Whether viewed as a description or aspiration, generosity, or its
related term of charity, is understood as willfully giving to others without being coerced to do so.
Giving one’s possessions, time and effort reflects attentiveness to and care for others just as it
puts one at the service of others. Early political thinkers like John Winthrop called upon
Americans to exemplify generosity, as it was a constitutive part of the Puritan faith. In “A
Modell of Christian Charity” (1630), Winthrop claimed that Americans were obligated to love
their neighbors because the bonds of “brotherly affection” bound them together into an organic
community.233 For Alexis De Tocqueville writing in the 1830s, generosity was less as an ideal
and more an empirical fact in American society. Without using the term explicitly, Tocqueville
observed how Americans’ construction of civic associations at an unprecedented rate reflected a
deep concern with their community. Without any incentive or coercion, they gave up their
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minds, hearts and bodies to tend to one another.234 Recently, reflecting on Americans’ charitable
donations at home and abroad, the conservative commentator, William J. Bennett, claimed that
generosity “is an inherent part of America's cultural fabric.”235 Such arguments that Americans
are generous reinforce the idea of American exceptionalism and offer proof that individualism is
unchallenged by other core American cultural values. Generosity implies moral commitment and
selflessness, which challenges arguments that that Americans are purely self-interested, greedy
and engaged in a competitive struggle where each is against all in the quest for upward mobility.
Yet understandings of generosity have also taken up specific forms. Throughout the 20th
century one dominant understanding of generosity was that it needed to be tethered to recipients’
adherence to normative moral standards. Early 20th century Progressives developing social
welfare programs to combat the massive economic inequality engendered by the Gilded Age
tethered these programs to moral uplift, social cleanliness and the eradication of degeneracy.236
Some explicitly argued that this enactment of generosity could purify American society and the
human race. In the words of historian Michael Katz, “from its inception, eugenics had close ties
to welfare.”237 More recently, 1980s neoconservatives argued for generosity to be tied explicitly
to developing in needy citizens a sense of self-reliance, responsibility and virtues of frugality and
sexual abstinence.238 For the political scientist, Lawrence Mead, the permissiveness of the
federal government’s proliferation of social welfare programs from the 1960s through the 1980s,
with no expectations placed on recipients, accounted for its failure as well as the reproduction of
dependence. For Mead, the solution lied in a new understanding of public generosity:
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reconstructing welfare programs with conditions and obligations in order to make them full,
functioning citizens. As he put it, the needy “need to face the requirements, such as work, that
true acceptance in American society requires. To create those obligations, they must be made
less free rather than more.”239
At the height of this 1980s neoconservative assault on the welfare state and embrace of
conditional aid tethered to work, itself made possible through demonizing images of African
American men and women as fiscally and morally irresponsible, Toni Morrison’s classic novel,
Beloved (1987), provided a theoretical exploration of generosity for racial justice. The novel
showed that a model of conditional generosity tethered to adherence to normative standards was
problematic for racial justice because it reinforced the power of those who enacted it and was
tentative. It showed that conditions constituted a form of power antithetical to the ethical impulse
behind giving because they relied on means-ends logic and reproduced the sovereignty of those
who gave at the expense of those who received. The novel showed that this, combined with the
fact that conditions relied upon and reinforced images of difference, helped sustain racial
inequality. At the same time, Beloved showed that although the love that underpinned a model
of unconditional generosity could become self-sabotaging and monopolizing, the fact that it had
no expiration date, was genuinely selfless and concerned with the well-being of others made it
valuable for racial justice. The lack of conditions in this model could enable ethical
responsiveness unfettered by means-ends calculations and could promote a form of vulnerability
that threatened one’s sovereignty over others. The novel showed that this, combined with the
model’s assumption that all were deserving of equal respect and capable of agency and that
vulnerability was inescapable, was crucial for counteracting the paternalism so central to racial
inequality. These reflections were indirect because, as a work of literature rather than political
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theory, Beloved neither provided direct arguments about politics nor advocated for certain public
policies. Nonetheless, the novel provided a much more sustained meditation on generosity than
Baldwin or Ellison and more clearly demonstrated why the assumptions upon which it relied
upon could themselves shape the possibility for racial justice. Additionally, far more than
Baldwin’s and Ellison’s work, which was often blind to gender and insufficiently attentive to
class difference, Beloved articulated these points with close attention to how it could affect
African American women and working-class citizens. This made for a richer analysis at once
more sensitive and complex.
Reading Beloved as I do here makes clear that the novel’s political-theoretical value lies
beyond its critique of neoconservative arguments about African American cultural pathology,240
its political theorization of prophecy and racial redemption in American politics 241 and the
significance of coming to terms with a traumatic past for post-colonial identity242 or for black
psychological health in a dominant, racist white culture.243 All these interpretations point to the
novel’s central narrative, which depicts a Postbellum community of ex-slaves in Cincinnati
grappling with the traumatic legacy of slavery as it is embodied in an infant ghost named
Beloved, murdered by her mother Sethe in an effort to save her from enslavement. What they
inadequately explore is that another central narrative thread in Beloved, in which the characters
struggle to create a flourishing community during Reconstruction with few economic resources
or opportunities, theorizes the politics of generosity. The novel examines the politics of
generosity through the town’s white abolitionist, Edward Bodwin’s, social assistance in
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exchange for work and adherence to normative standards. To attend to this is not to consider
Beloved a Morrison’s ongoing literary attempt to formulate an ethical narrative and metanarrative of the African American racial experience.244 It is instead to consider how Beloved’s
fictionalization of a too-often neglected or disavowed African American historical moment
illuminates Morrison’s political-theoretical consideration of community, freedom, equality and
care that cuts across the color line.
Beloved’s epigraph gestures towards this dual objective of particularity and universality,
as Morrison quoted St. Paul’s assertion in Romans 9:25 that God would love Gentile Romans
who showed no fidelity to him, “I will call them my people, which were not my people; and her
beloved, which was not beloved.”245 On the one hand, Morrison’s naming and loving the painful
African American experience of slavery and Reconstruction remakes the experience of “her
people” as valuable and worth recalling. On the other hand, Morrison’s naming and loving the
white American majority of which she was not part, “my people, which were not my people,”
positions her audience as potential recipients of the novel’s insights about how generosity could
shape the possibility for justice. The novel thus participates in political-theoretical debates about
care. Some political theorists see the totalizing moralism inherent in generosity as inherently
problematic for politics, which is based in and requires plurality, disagreement and contention.246
Generosity’s historical connection to theology thus undermines its secular potential. Others,
cognizant of these limitations, reconstruct generosity to chasten its moralism while retaining its
ethical impulse. Generosity becomes valuable for politics because it offers something for
enriching community life and political coalition building that reason or the rule of law alone
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cannot.247 Yet, insofar as racial equality depends on an elimination of white paternalism and an
end to the unequal distribution of authority what has remained unexplored is how different
practices of generosity contain and reinforce assumptions about human agency, mastery, control,
equality and reciprocity. Beloved develops powerful insights into this.
Morrison’s use of the black experience to provide broader political-theoretical insights
about the human condition followed from what she believed was the chief responsibility of
African American intellectuals. First, like Baldwin and Ellison, she saw as decidedly myopic
African American protest literature’s concern with persuading white America of the plight of
Afro-America or exposing the cultural connections between Afro-America and Africa. Morrison
instead asserted that all American writers needed to “enlighten [and] strengthen” Americans
through providing coherence to a world in which ideas were constantly in flux and communities
renegotiating themselves.248 Understanding African Americans’ response to a condition of
precariousness, Morrison insisted, not only illuminated something specific about the African
American experience 249 but also something about the universality of victimhood, which like
Baldwin, she understood as inescapable: “all of us, in some measure, [are] victims of
something.”250 Second, Morrison, like Baldwin, understood the function of her work not as
describing reality or prescribing solutions to its contradictions, but as that which bore witness to
an American condition of vulnerability too difficult to digest or come to terms with. Third,
Morrison’s art, unlike Ellison’s, was unconcerned with exposing contradiction, ambiguity or
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paradox, but with taking “cataracts off people in an accessible way.”251 Far more than for
Ellison, Morrison maintained that the novel’s reliance on narrative enabled its democratic
potential, as it enlisted readers to infer meaning from a language that would resonate with their
experience of everyday life.252 This was partly why Morrison asserted that, rather than logical
argumentation, “narrative remains the best way to learn anything, whether history or
theology.”253 Fourth, tragedy was the genre through which Morrison constructed her own
narratives. Yet far more than Ellison, she saw tragedy’s core value as coming from its inducing
of catharsis, revelatory effects and haunting impact upon readers.254 Tragedy was especially
suitable for a strong visceral emotional response that allowed citizens to contemplate and
reassess their deepest commitments. As she explained, “I want a very strong visceral response
and emotional response as well as a very clear intellectual response, and the haunting that you
describe is testimony to that…I want to give them something to feel and think about.”255

Conditional Social Assistance, Sovereign Authority and Dependence
It is through the character of Edward Bodwin, a white former abolitionist, that Morrison most
obviously dramatizes how conditional generosity exacerbates African American marginalization.
There is good evidence that Bodwin exemplifies a spirit of generosity as he and his sister,
committed abolitionists, provide African Americans jobs, housing and other forms of financial
assistance. Bodwin’s care, sensitivity and provision of assistance reflect a counterpoint to the
violent slaveholder, schoolteacher’s whip, animus towards, objectification of and utter contempt
for his African American slaves. Bodwin is presented as always welcoming, or, in the words of
251
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Stamp Paid, “somebody never turned us down. Steady as a rock.”256 Yet, Paid’s characterization
fails to grasp the full picture. Bodwin’s generous aid is itself conditionally tethered to low-wage
work, which effectively reproduces African American economic marginalization. Whereas
Suggs performs certain domestic tasks for Bodwin in exchange for financial support, such as
cobbling, canning, laundry and seamstress work, she dies with few assets, and on her deathbed
describes herself as nothing but “a nigger woman hauling shoes.”257 Likewise, although Denver
does nighttime domestic work for Bodwin, she seeks out extra opportunities to make money, still
struggling to support herself and her destitute mother Sethe: “she had heard about an afternoon
job at the shirt factory. She hoped that with her night work at the Bodwins’ and another one, she
could put away something and help her mother too.”258 Bodwin is certainly no slaveholder, but
Morrison shows how his instrumental understanding of black labor itself parallels the slaveowning classes’ understanding of black life as a source of profit-making. At the novel’s
conclusion, Bodwin’s rationale for arriving to 124 Bluestone in order to “bring back the girl
[Denver],”259 which sees African Americans as nameless workers with labor power instead of
sentient, multifaceted human subjects, mirrors schoolteacher’s rationale for retrieving Sethe and
her children alive. This uncanny similarity is evident in schoolteacher’s statement that his
decision is predicated on a calculation of his nameless ex-slaves labor and exchange value, for “a
dead nigger could not be skinned for profit and was not worth his own dead weight in coin.”260
Bodwin’s profit from the exchange of these women’s labor for his aid only benefits him and
keeps both Suggs and Denver economically marginalized. Bodwin benefits from their domestic
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work but undervalues it so that Suggs and Denver spend hours to improve Bodwin’s domestic
life only to struggle for financial stability and the free time to enrich their own lives.
Yet Morrison shows that Bodwin’s aid is counterproductive for racial justice not solely
because it requires low-wage work but because it also depends on African Americans’ adherence
to what he deems to be moral standards, which they neither create nor control. Readers learn in
one passage that Bodwin has told Sethe’s mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, that her rent-free
residence is contingent on self-discipline: “they would permit her to stay there. Provided she was
clean. The past parcel of colored wasn’t.”261 In another, we learn that Bodwin’s decision to
provide Sethe’s daughter, Denver, with employment is presented as also requiring her to submit
to a reeducation program according to his sister’s, and presumably his own, moral standards.
Denver explains, “Miss Bodwin taught [me] stuff…’She says I might go to Oberlin. She’s
experimenting on me.’”262 Morrison demonstrates that Bodwin’s aid places the burden of proof
on African Americans to show that they are “clean,” a broad character trait which connotes
sexual purity and honesty, as well as its more literal meaning of personal hygiene. The problem
with these characterizations is not simply that they are inaccurate, demeaning or hateful. The
problem instead comes from the fact that those who are subjects to these characterizations have
no control over whether they properly adhere to them, but depend upon this adherence to sustain
decent living conditions. Morrison makes clear that Bodwin’s sovereign judgment is especially
troubling not simply because of his unilateral power to decide and influence, but because of his
latent, unreconstructed and presumptive racism, his centralizing of deviance as integral to black
culture. Although believing in the equitable sanctity of humanity [“human life is holy, all of
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it”263] Bodwin assumes that blackness is fundamentally marked by dependency and laziness. A
racist moneybox in Bodwin’s home depicts a black boy with bulging eyes and gaping mouth,
bending towards its owner with excitement at being paid a pittance. Denver notices it as soon as
she arrives to the Bodwin home: “sitting on a shelf by the black door, a blackboy’s mouth full of
money…Bulging like moons, two eyes were all the face he had about the gaping red
mouth…And he was on his knees. His mouth, wide as a cup, held coins needed to pay for a
delivery or some other small service….Painted across the pedestal he knelt on were the words
“At Yo Service.” 264
Morrison gestures towards the way Bodwin’s absolute power to define and assess
adherence to moral standards, alongside his assumption of African American deviance and
inferiority, presents a continuation of African American oppression under slavery. Bodwin’s aid
only marginally improves African American financial hardship but itself keeps his power over
African Americans firmly intact. Morrison thus positions his actions as not only paralleling
schoolteacher’s argument that “definitions belonged to the definers—not the defined”265 but his
argument that African Americans must be humanized and enlightened. Schoolteacher’s
notebooks chronicle his slaves’ deviation from the idea that all individuals possess universal
reason as he limns their animal characteristics alongside their human ones.266 It is ambiguous
whether schoolteacher believes there to be some intractable biological difference between whites
and blacks that simply cannot be cured through education, but Morrison illustrates that his
enlightenment faith put into the service of enslavement anticipates Bodwin’s behavior. Like
Bodwin, schoolteacher, as his name itself connotes, sees knowledge, connected to moral uplift,
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as a way towards freedom. Schoolteacher’s own reasoned anthropological categorization maps
out his slaves’ humanity and simultaneously reifies this humanity as fundamentally different. At
the same time, his characterization of blacks as somehow not quite reasonable and certainly
inferior to whites reinforces his power and authority, implying that to become more reasonable
they must follow his advice. Paul D describes it at one point,
...for schoolteacher didn’t take advice from Negroes. The information they offered he
called backtalk and developed a variety of corrections (which he recorded in his
notebook) to reeducate them. He complained they ate too much, rested too much, talked
too much, which was certainly true compared to him, because schoolteacher ate little,
spoke less and rested not at all.267
Schoolteacher, like Bodwin, presumptively assumes African Americans to be impure, lazy and
dependent: neither sees them as equals and believes their salvation depends upon submission to
white authority. Paul D recognizes as much when his first impulse is to tell Denver, who has just
revealed Bodwin’s sister’s plans to educate her, “Watch out. Watch out. Nothing in the world
more dangerous than a white schoolteacher.” 268 Morrison’s illustration thus confirms Michel
Foucault’s argument that power is dispersed and decentralized through knowledge discourses. At
the same time she shows that these discourses almost unconsciously and unequally frame the
real-world power of the dominant groups over those who are marginalized.269 Schoolteacher’s
scientific racism and Bodwin’s embrace of cultural pathology arguments solidified their
dominance over the novel’s black characters. Morrison’s depiction of these discourses as so
entrenched, natural and central to each character’s worldview implicitly challenge Foucault’s
argument that resistance to them from below was likely or even possible.
Notwithstanding the obvious parallels with schoolteacher, what Morrison illuminates
about the conditional nature of Bodwin’s generosity is that it makes his aid fundamentally
267
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tenuous and unreliable. At the novel’s conclusion, Sethe attempts to stab Bodwin with an ice
pick as he arrives to pick Denver up for work. Bodwin interprets her action as governed by a
pathological worldview, much as he views the black women gathered at Sethe’s doorstop to
exorcize Beloved from her home as driven by a pathological rage toward one another, a
predictable collection of “colored women fighting” at a place “full of trouble.”270 Reflecting his
own limitation to listen generously, Bodwin fails to comprehend that Sethe mistakenly stabs him
because she identifies him as schoolteacher, whose prior arrival there prompted the infanticide
around which the narrative revolves; or that Sethe’s mistaken identity as pathological is partly a
circumstantial outcome of her increased alienation as a black single-mother who has just lost her
low-wage job and savings. In other words, Morrison points out that Bodwin is unable to
comprehend the world that Sethe inhabits as one that undervalues black women’s work, a
product of what Patricia Hill Collins calls “the interlocking systems of race, gender and class
oppression.”271 All that he is able to see is Sethe’s failure to fulfill the condition he has earlier
articulated to Baby Suggs: cleanliness. Yet his obliviousness has real consequences, as Bodwin
decides to sell 124 Bluestone, putting Sethe on the brink of homelessness.
Understanding these effects of Bodwin’s conditional generosity revises a dominant
interpretation of how Sethe’s decision to stab him represents Morrison’s critique of liberalism.
James Berger argues that Sethe’s decision demonstrates Morrison’s repudiation of white liberal
paternalism but simultaneous acknowledgment that white American liberals’ historic
commitment to assisting African Americans nonetheless deserves respect.272 For Berger, Sethe’s
increasing impoverishment and grief render her delusional, unable to see that Bodwin is not
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schoolteacher but instead an imperfect friend. However, Berger’s wish for this twofold
interpretation deprives Sethe of moral agency and critical awareness, which forms the impetus
for her conscious decision to kill Beloved for fear of allowing her back into slavery. We may
actually interpret Sethe’s attempted stabbing of Bodwin as a conscious, rather than delusional,
attempt to protect her living daughter, Denver, from Bodwin’s problematic generosity. Sethe’s
statement, which references schoolteacher’s arrival at 124 Bluestone, that Bodwin is “coming
into her yard...coming for her best thing,”273 “best thing” can be taken to mean her fear that
Bodwin has come to retrieve Denver to work for him. On this interpretation, Sethe understands
that Bodwin’s unconditional generosity has no value precisely because it continues racial
inequality through low-wage work and forcing African Americans to adhere to the moral
standards that he deems adequate.
Conditional Listening, Thoughtlessness and Distrust
Yet Beloved also dramatizes how conditional listening, which exceeds conditional economic
assistance, could shape the potential for racial justice. A narrow focus on economic assistance
misses the power of citizens’ capacity to respectfully attend to, acknowledge and absorb others’
perspectives, needs and experiences. Morrison illustrates conditional listening through Paul D’s
transformation from someone who is open, sensitive, and compassionate towards and mutually
identifies with Sethe to someone who is closed, insensitive and feels intractable distance from
her. This shift occurs upon his hearing Sethe confess her killing of Beloved, which stands in
stark contrast to Paul D’s understanding of normative behavior. Sethe’s explanation, which
presumes that Paul D’s initial compassion would be made manifest in his willingness to
unconditionally listen, is that “...they ain’t at Sweet Home. Schoolteacher ain’t got them...it’s my
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job to know what is and to keep them away from what I know is terrible. I did that.”274
Morrison’s illuminating the difference between the violent act and Sethe’s decidedly moral, even
if tragic, intentions behind it highlight the obvious space for Paul D to try to thoughtfully
understand, respect and acknowledge her perspective and experience. However, he fails to
register any of this. Mirroring schoolteacher’s racist anthropology, he interprets the act as
reflecting Sethe’s animal, non-human character, “You got two feet, Sethe, not four.”275 Satya
Mohanty reads this response as Morrison’s dramatization of the post-colonial male’s difficulty of
acknowledging the importance of marginalized black women’s experiences within
colonialism.276 Yet from a different vantage point, Paul D’s behavior reflects Morrison’s critique
of conditional generosity for gender and racial equality. His giving, like Bodwin’s, is tentative
and unreliable because it is governed by standards over which he maintains complete
sovereignty. But Paul D’s normative standard is more explicitly gendered than Bodwin’s,
reflecting a problematic attachment to black masculinity. Upon hearing her story, he is horrified
by the “bitch...looking at him. ” No longer a passive object in need of his male guidance, Sethe
becomes something more monstrous: “That she lived with 124 in helpless, apologetic resignation
because she had no choice...The prickly, mean-eyed Sweet Home girl he knew as Halle’s girl
was obedient (like Halle), shy (like Halle), and work crazy (like Halle). He was wrong.”277 Even
if it arises as a consequence of a postmodern black masculinity simultaneously self-aware of
one’s male power and emasculation,278Morrison’s describing of Paul D’s nameless
characterization of Sethe as a sweet home girl, whose identity is irreducibly tied to her husband,
makes vivid the ease with which masculinity can denigrate black women’s sovereignty and
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agency. Yet, she also shows that Paul D’s failure to see Sethe as his equal works in conjunction
with his conditional listening to make racial justice increasingly difficult. First, Paul D’s
unilateral judgment stifles the potential for emotional solidarity and mutual trust between him
and Sethe, which could become a powerful source of resilience within a condition of racial
oppression. This point is crystallized in Sethe’s reflection that “a forest sprang up between them;
trackless and quiet”279 and later “Paul D...gave her back he body, kissed her divided back, stirred
her rememory and brought her more news...but when he heard her news, he counted her feet and
didn’t even say goodbye.”280 This intensifies Sethe’s feeling of hopelessness, increasing
obsession with a wounded past and thwarts any effort at responding to her own or other African
Americans’ insecurity. This withdrawal is captured in her claim that “[w]hatever is going on
outside my door ain’t for me. The world is in this room. This here’s all there is and all there
needs to be.”281 Second, the breach of unlimited, non-judgmental listening prevents Paul D from
understanding how racial oppression itself is layered, complex and dependent upon subject
positions rather than something abstract or generalizable. Morrison thus illuminated a unique
aspect of the politics of recognition. Disrespect and disesteem of others’ identities and
experiences could be produced not simply through malicious bad faith or ignorance 282 but
through deep attachment to what are imagined as higher, universal moral norms. Sethe’s
violation of the moral prohibition against murder is what accounts for Paul D’s failure to listen to
her perspective. Paul D’s failure to listen precludes him from acknowledging Sethe’s awareness
of the threat of unequal sexual violence directed towards black women: the rape she experienced
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at the hands of schoolteacher’s nephews and the rape her mother experienced on the slave ship
across the Middle Passage, as she was “taken up many times by the crew.”283 This awareness
translates into Sethe’s concern, in the words of Denver, “that anybody white could take your
whole self for anything that came to mind. Not just work, kill, or maim you, but dirty you. Dirty
you so bad you couldn’t think it up.”284 Sethe understands that black women face a specific kind
of marginalization because they are both considered racially inferior as blacks and as women are
objects of masculine desire in a society where their implicit consent is always assumed and their
bodies inadequately protected by official political institutions. Neglecting this makes it difficult
for Paul D to see that Sethe’s concerns and needs are radically distinct from his own. Sethe’s
reluctance about welcoming him into her home and her implicit resistance to him assuming the
role of the family patriarch for fear of patriarchy is something he can neither grasp nor honor.
Unconditional Generosity, Freedom and Flourishing
From a different perspective, Beloved also demonstrates an alternative if neglected model of
unconditional generosity symbolized through the novel’s women. A focus on the novel’s
depiction of the African American community’s regeneration through historical recollection, as
both an apotropaic act of preemptive self-healing through a paradoxical self-wounding, misses
its making vivid a productive mode of ethical engagement.285 What the novel shows is that the
conceptualization and practice of unconditional aid and listening contains rich possibilities for
racial justice because it has no expiration date and primarily aims to enable its recipients to live a
flourishing existence.
At a general level, Morrison shows how their generosity, strikingly opposed to Bodwin’s
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model, embodies a feminist argument that all individuals are equally entitled to care. As Virginia
Held writes of care ethics generally, “the central focus of the ethics of care is on the compelling
moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take
responsibility.”286 Morrison’s description of Baby Suggs’s generosity to all who enter her home
reveals this ethic of care:
“...124 had been a cheerful, buzzing house where Baby Suggs, holy, loved, cautioned,
fed, chastised and soothed. Where not one but two pots simmered on the stove; where the
lamp burned all night long. Strangers rested while children tried on their shoes. Messages
were left there, for whoever needed them was sure to stop in one day soon.”287
Without conditions or stipulations, Suggs offers individuals free emotional support, food,
clothing and shelter. That she does this even for strangers shows that an ethical imperative rather
than a rational calculation drives her action. She provides care to all, whether it is costly,
troublesome or personally disadvantageous: like her home, her care is free and available to all.
Suggs’ exemplary practices echo what the political theorist, William Connolly, understands as a
crucial ethos of democratic citizenship: “[c]ritical responsiveness takes the form of careful
listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or
degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a
place on one or more of those registers.”288 There is, however, the obvious difficulty of
acknowledging this vision amidst the seductive ideology of individualism. Sethe refuses to ask
for support from her community not simply because of immobilizing grief but because she
harbors excessive pride. She not only engages in sex-work, rather than asking for financial
assistance, in order to pay for Beloved’s tombstone, but she bears the grief, pain and guilt issuing
from Beloved’s death personally, without any help. This individualism is echoed in Denver’s
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approaching the black women of her community for aid, when she thinks that “asking for help
from strangers was worse than hunger.”289
Eddie Glaude reads Denver’s decision to approach the women amidst hardship as a
model for a pragmatic-tragic vision of black politics, which acknowledges the constrained nature
of black agency in America but nonetheless constructs creative ways to practice it.290 But what
he misses is Morrison’s illustration of the women’s countering Denver’s individualism and
recollection as Suggs’ care-based assistance as central to black politics: “[a]ll of them knew her
grandmother and some had even danced with her in the Clearing. Others remembered the days
when 124 was a way station, the place they assembled to catch news, taste oxtail soup, leave
their children, cut out a skirt.”291 Denver relies on Bodwin’s assumption that all aid requires
work and that she has no entitlement to care when she asks one of the women, Lady Jones,
“could she do chores in the morning?”292 What Lady Jones makes clear is that Denver’s request
and her need are the only two criteria for aid: “if you all need to eat until your mother is well, all
you have to do is to say so.”293 Rather than being dependent upon the judgment of a benefactor,
Morrison emphasizes how the black women’s assistance is available regardless of whether they
see in Denver failure of moral character: “[s]ome even laughed at Denver’s clothes of a hussy,
but it didn’t stop them from caring whether she ate...”294 The women provide Denver with food
to maintain her bodily health, “some rice, four eggs and some tea”295 and basic emotional
support and receptive listening through weekly meetings to alleviate her distress. Denver
eventually learns that this is aid based on the responsibility to care, rather than strategic interest,
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and that all it requires is a sincere expression of gratitude, a “Thank You.”296
Yet Beloved’s exploration of this model of generosity also shows that what makes it
valuable for racial justice is its assumption of critical respect towards others, deference to their
authority and acceptance of benefactors’ greater vulnerability. This exploration enriches care
theory in ways that go beyond justifying the political importance of and ethical obligation to
care. First, through Baby Suggs’, Morrison demonstrates that this model of unconditional
generosity reflects the assumption that all subjects are equally deserving of respect, which
undermines the disrespect so central to racial hierarchy. At some level, the novel makes clear
that Suggs’ aid is predicated upon enabling citizens to love themselves, or seeing themselves as
sources of self-worth, which is a counterpoint to the logic of black objectification under slavery.
The slave system reduced the constitutive parts of the black body to its property value for profitmaximization, as is made apparent through Paul D’s recognition of his worth, “He has always
known, or believed he did, his value—as a hand, a laborer who could make profit on a farm—but
now he discovers his worth, which is to say his price. The dollar value of his weight, his strength,
his heart, his brain, his penis, and his future.”297 For Suggs, in contrast, the black body must be
loved, sanctified and seen as more than just an economic source of use or exchange value. The
sanctity of the body calls for its protection and preservation, rather than its violation and
denigration. Seeking to convince ex-slaves to repossess their bodies, she makes this clear when
she says:
[a]nd O my people they do not love your hands. Those they only use, tie, bind, chop off
and leave empty. Love your hands! Love them. Raise them up and kiss them. Touch
others with them, pat them together, stroke them on your face ‘cause they don’t love that
either. You got to love it, you!...More than your life-holding womb and your life giving
parts, hear me now, love your heart.”298
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Morrison demonstrates that Suggs’ generosity is itself driven by urging individuals to love
themselves, which assumes that all individuals are agents capable of self-love and themselves
deserving of others’ love. The radicalism of this assumption comes not from challenging the
ideology of negative freedom or exceeding the liberal preoccupation with ensuring security
through laws. Its radicalism comes from its viewing and approaching others as worthy of respect,
value and dignity. This is a counter-model to the perspective that requires recipient to adhere to
normative social standards, encapsulated by Bodwin and Paul D, which presumes them to be
somehow unequal, always potentially deviant or incapable of properly articulating what is in
their best interest.
Second, Morrison demonstrates that the black women’s rationale for this model of
unconditional generosity, which rests on the assumption that all citizens deserve basic resources
that liberate them from oppressive need, centralizes how vulnerability is an inescapable
condition for all black citizens. Understanding this undermines feelings of superiority, moralism
and distance within the black community. The black women eventually reflect on their decision
to help Denver, describing one probable justification as simply that “...when trouble rode bare
back among them, quickly, easily they did what they could to trip him up.”299 This implies that
their feeling of responsibility stemmed from a belief that they were obligated to minimize any
obstacle to her freedom; a belief that parallels capability theorists’ arguments that freedom is
only possible after the establishment of basic necessities. Following Amartya Sen’s claim that
“[human] development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedom that leave people
with little choice and little opportunity for exercising their reasoned agency,”300 Martha
Nussbaum contends that the basic necessities which allow us to develop a sense of the good and

299
300

Ibid., 249.
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), xii.

105

engage in meaningful relationships include bodily health and integrity, emotions, and practical
reason.301 Yet, far more than capability theorists, the black women cast the inescapability of
suffering for all black citizens, rather than a reformulation of what freedom requires, as the
condition for giving basic resources. The black women’s use of the term “when” that signals
anticipation and necessity, “when trouble rode bare among them” as opposed to “if,” which
connotes possibility and uncertainty, makes clear an understanding that suffering will necessarily
come, that it is inescapable. This view is captured most forcefully through Ella, who leads the
women of Sethe’s community to gather around 124 Bluestone to exorcize Beloved. Ella is, in
many ways, the anti-Sethe: a devout-pragmatist and amoralist. Morrison highlights her
phronesis, what Aristotle understands to be practical wisdom about negotiating reality,302 when
describing her as “a practical woman who believed there was a root either to chew or avoid for
every ailment.303 Not only is Ella skeptical of any model of ethics born of victimization but she
also believes that love cannot be the foundation for action, “for she considered love a serious
disability.”304 These differences, along with Ella’s outspoken hostility for what she understands
as Sethe’s hubristic decision to isolate herself from her community, create little reason for Ella to
exorcise Beloved. But they are insufficient for preventing Ella from unconditionally assisting
Sethe, as she believes that no one should be left alone, without resources, to negotiate
oppression. Morrison notes how Ella “could not countenance the possibility of sin moving on in
the house, unleashed and sassy. Daily life took as much as she had...Slave life; freed life--every
day was a test and a trial. Nothing could be counted on in a world where even when you were a
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solution you were a problem.”305 Ella’s racialized statement centered on how black citizens
cannot escape insecurity, danger and being a problem to others departs from Baldwin’s
centralizing of vulnerability as a condition for all citizens, irrespective of race, class and gender.
Yet, far more than Baldwin, Ella’s understanding provides a way to think about how black
Americans’ acknowledging shared vulnerability can establish solidarity within the black
community, which is neither monolithic nor immune from moralism, classism, homophobia and
sexism.306 Ella’s understanding that white supremacy makes black Americans socially insecure
promotes an understanding of Sethe as an equal rather than superior. Ella’s attentiveness to this
is sharpened by her own experience of being raped and forced to give birth to her white
slaveholders’ child but also reflects a general understanding of how the potential for white
racism make black everyday life a perpetual struggle against hardship, irrespective of formal,
legal freedom. Ella’s recognition prompts her to jettison her philosophical differences with
Sethe, as Beloved’s exacerbation of Sethe’s difficulties makes Ella come to Sethe’s aid, without
any expectations or conditions. Sethe’s gratitude for this deed is conveyed at the conclusion of
the novel, as she is depicted as running into the black women’s arms and “loving faces”307as they
exorcize Beloved, as well as the pain, hopelessness, and despair that the ghost has caused her.
Third, through Amy Denver, Morrison illustrates that this model of unconditional
generosity reflects the willingness for one to become vulnerable, which helps challenge the
norms by which racial inequality is sustained. Amy is a white woman, an indentured servant
heading to Boston, who encounters a pregnant Sethe who is on the verge of starvation upon
escaping Sweet Home. It is Sethe who at first fails to generously listen to Amy’s story, quickly
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judging her as “the raggediest-looking trash you ever saw” who “needed beef and pot liquor like
nobody in this world…[and] talked so much it wasn’t clear how she could breathe at the same
time.”308 Despite this, Amy offers Sethe unconditional support by naming the “chokecherry
tree,” the scar from her beatings by schoolteacher’s nephews, massages her feet and helps her
give birth to her daughter, who she eventually names after Amy: Denver. Amy Denver’s
response shows how unconditional generosity cuts across racial lines and reflects Baldwin’s and
Ellison’s claim that an ethical obligation to others requires one to become vulnerable. Yet far
more than Baldwin and Ellison, Morrison illuminates how Denver’s face-to-face encounter with
Sethe itself exemplifies what the philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, understood as the first
condition of ethics. Confronted with the face of the stranger, one is held in a condition of
hostage, of obligation to it. As he wrote, “[t]he being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does
so precisely by appealing to me with its destitution and nudity—its hunger—without my being
able to be deaf to that appeal.”309 For Levinas, one abandons their sovereignty, threatens their
own security and puts them at greater risk to meet the obligations that another sentient being
imposes upon them. As if to dramatize the ways in which she has little rational reason to help,
Morrison foregrounds Amy’s awareness of the distance and inequality between herself and Sethe
when she says, “[a]in’t nobody after me but I know somebody after you.”310 Moreover, Amy
herself knows that this encounter is ephemeral, “they never expected to see each other again in
this world and at the moment couldn’t care less.”311 However, Amy’s self-imposed vulnerability,
which comes not only from her complete deference to Sethe’s needs but from her risky, illegal
decision, to assist a fugitive slave, who occupies an obvious position of social weakness before
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her, exemplifies Levinas’ point. Morrison illustrates Amy’s awareness that an ethical obligation
is violent, an act of self-sacrifice and immolation. That it puts one at risk by undoing selfsovereignty exemplifies a form of irrationalism; but this irrationalism helps reverse a racial order
in which whites are independent, powerful and autonomous and blacks are dependent, weak and
with compromised agency.
Fourth, Morison shows that a core, even if implicit, assumption of these practices of
generosity is that all individuals are presumptively seen as capable of exercising their own
account of the good, which challenges the racial assumption that African Americans are
incapable of this endeavor. A form of giving that defers to and assumes the capacity for
recipients’ judgment, without conditions or stipulations, reflects a belief that those who receive
assistance might be constrained but not incapable of self-governing. Suggs, Lady Jones, Ella and
Amy Denver see Sethe and Denver as capable of volitionally and independently constructing
their desires in ways not directed by men or whites. This presumption itself connects to a larger
understanding throughout the novel that freedom is about exercising this judgment, rather than
being independent of external impediments. Paul D crystallizes this idea of freedom in the
positive sense as based on a guarantee (“to get a place”) that enables one to desire anything they
choose without permission: “to get a place where you could love anything you chose—not to
need permission for desire—well now, that was freedom.”312
Love and the Limits of Unconditional Generosity
Yet just as Beloved highlights the productive value for racial justice of the care upon which this
unconditional generosity rested, it shows that it could be counterproductive for it. In a certain
sense, Morrison follows Ellison by showing that care’s direct focus on responding to the task at
hand makes it a potentially unstable stable ground for long-term decisions. Sethe herself defends
312
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her thick love as a basis for the immediate task of preventing her children from coming back to
Sweet Home, “[t]hey ain’t at Sweet Home. Schoolteacher ain’t got em”313 but the long-term
effects of this love are much murkier. Sethe’s thick love is at least partly responsible for the guilt
and remorse she feels for her daughter’s death, a guilt that incapacitates her ability to remain
resilient amidst intense poverty and painful memories. Eventually, Morrison describes how Sethe
comes to accept Baby Suggs’ dying words of despair—"Lay em down, Sethe. Sword and Shield.
Down. Down. Both of em Down..[against] “misery, regret, gall and hurt.”314 Yet Morrison’s
illustration of love’s limits illustrates something Ellison overlooked. First, Sethe’s defense of the
infanticide as an act of immense love itself shows how love could actually sabotage the
flourishing of those towards whom it is directed. When Paul D tells her, “[y]our love is too
thick,” gesturing towards the way excessive love can have a suffocating effect, Sethe responds
emphatically, “love is or it ain’t. Thin love ain’t love at all...They ain’t at Sweet Home.
Schoolteacher ain’t got em...It ain’t my job to know what’s worse. It’s my job to know what is
and to keep them from what I know is terrible. I did that.”315 That Sethe’s maternal love, rather
than fear, motivates her decision to save her children from the brutal institution of slavery
foregrounds her complex moral agency. Yet, the force of this love, which forms the basis of a
judgment that exceeds the dictates of the law, is not problematic because it leads to an illegal
action but because it is blinding and totalizing. Sethe unilaterally makes the determination about
whether Beloved’s life is worth living. This sweeping, all-encompassing love blinds Sethe to her
Beloved’s agency and desire, compelling her to make sovereign decisions about her life over
which she have no choice. Second, Morrison shows that love could be self-sabotaging because
its outward investment in others could leave little room to attending to the needs of one’s self.
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Sethe’s investment in Beloved’s ghost, her desire to lavish her with unconditional generosity in
the form of fancy food and dresses and unlimited attention, ultimately brings Sethe to the brink
of death. She spends her thirty-eight dollars of life savings and alienates herself from everyone
close to her. Sethe’s absorption by Beloved is still maintained even after Beloved is exorcized by
the town’s women: the concluding scene shows Sethe expressionlessly staring out the window
mourning the loss of Beloved who she calls “her best thing.” When Paul D reminds her that she
is “her best thing,” Sethe’s response illuminates her inability to recognize that she herself
requires love. Perplexed, she responds, “Me? Me?”316
Beloved, Generosity and American Public Policy
This concluding depiction of Sethe jobless and on the verge of being homeless, alongside Denver
working multiple low-wage jobs struggling to support her, calls into question whether any kind
of generosity is sufficient for combating deep and pervasive racial inequality. Generosity’s
transformative potential might be limited given that it is individual rather than state-based, that it
depends on fickle, fragile citizens rather than the coercion of the state, that it can be momentary
and everyday rather than something directed through long-lasting public policies. The novel’s
final word, “Beloved,” which can refer to the traumatic effects of slavery, seems to suggest that
Sethe’s and Denver’s destitution is itself a continuation of slavery shaping African American
socioeconomic opportunities and psychological well-being. Critics thus note that the concluding
refrain of the novel’s epilogue, “it was not a story to pass on,”317 seems to suggest Morrison’s
own ambiguous directive to readers. Either this legacy of slavery is too difficult, troubling and
depressing to transmit to posterity or it should not be overlooked.318
Yet to read the final word, “Beloved,” in conjunction with the refrain, “this is not a story
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to pass on,” in this way is to overlook another, equally plausible, interpretation. That what should
not be overlooked is the narrative’s depiction of divergent models of generosity about how
citizens ought to “be-loved.” The final question then becomes: will readers acknowledge the
pernicious effects and problematic assumptions of a model of conditional or embrace an
unacknowledged, even if not completely unproblematic, model of unconditional generosity? Will
they pass these lessons to others or will they pass on them? In addition, just because the novel
examines everyday interactions does not mean that the larger political theoretical insights that
emerge from this exploration should be seen as applicable only to them. For example, a
theoretical understanding of why conditional generosity is problematic for racial justice helps
clarify the ramifications of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 transformation of American welfare policy’s program of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) into Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). AFDC
was a federal entitlement program designed to give benefits to low-income households on the
basis of need, but TANF makes aid contingent upon the performance of wage labor and
encourages states to use federal money to discourage of out-of-wedlock births. Some states even
make TANF eligibility contingent upon mandatory drug testing or restrict it for those with drug
felony convictions. Beloved provides crucial theoretical insight into how these factors threaten to
solidify the legacies of slavery and Jim Crow, make African Americans’ lives, including many
African American single mothers’ lives, dependent upon minimal financial assistance tethered to
low paying jobs, reeducation into normative standards of family life and a host of other
conditions. It also provides a lens through which to examine how such a policy itself could
reinforce white American paternalism, intensify white American assumptions about black
cultural pathology and contain a host of problematic assumptions about gender. At the same
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time, Beloved dramatizes the importance of unconditional forms of assistance for racial justice in
which respect and equality are assumed and self-sacrifice enacted. Whether in discussions about
welfare policy, affirmative action or monetary reparations for unpaid black labor under slavery
and Jim Crow, perhaps the crucial question that should motivate the distribution of resources to
citizens is whether it enables them to “be loved.”
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Chapter 5:
Beyond Reconstructing the Nation
This dissertation has argued that twentieth century African American political thinkers
illuminated how dominant cultural understandings about the extent of freedom in American
society, democratic commitment and generosity need to be revised for racial justice. A careful
engagement with the essays and fiction of James Baldwin, Ralph Ellison and Toni Morrison has
shown each thinker’s demonstration of the way these understanding might shape citizens’
enactment of care, their sense of obligation, self-perception, communication with others, sense of
political possibility and willingness to act at a level that precedes public policy or legislation. I
have shown how attention to this deepens thinking about each thinker, broader discussions about
racial justice, African American radicalism and the art and politics of African American
intellectuals. In this conclusion, I discuss this dissertation’s broader implications.
First, my analysis confirms yet complicates the time-honored thesis of the American
studies scholar, Sacvan Bercovitch, that Americans across the political spectrum return to the set
of values associated with America because “America” “continues to provide the terms of identity
and cohesion in the United States.”319 That Baldwin and Ellison directly tethered the political
cultural beliefs they engaged as central to American identity and Morrison’s Beloved did so
indirectly illuminates that even American dissidents draw upon the ideas, symbols and myths
associated with the transhistorical idea of “America.” Yet, by at once critiquing and showing
how these beliefs should be revised for emancipatory politics, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison
illustrated that understandings central to American identity could be constructed to resist the
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narrow confines of liberalism and to discourage an uncritical from of patriotism, faith in
triumphalism and progress.
Second, their work provides a unique contribution to debates in political theory. Reading
their work as enriching political theory follows Michael Hanchard’s argument that black political
thought’s unique concern with racial domination and racism in modernity can complicate
understandings of the political, emancipation, freedom and community.320 To this end, Baldwin,
Ellison and Morrison provide answers to perennial debates within American political thought. To
the question of what makes America exceptional, each challenges the social democratic
interpretation espoused by Walt Whitman and Richard Rorty321 and the liberal interpretation of
Alexis De Tocqueville and Louis Hartz. 322 American exceptionalism is for social democrats
founded in its commitment to radical democracy whereas for liberals it is rooted in its irrational
Lockean commitment to the values of political equality, individual freedom, private property and
a limited state. Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison each show in contrast that one potential source of
American exceptionalism comes from Americans’ ability to rationalize personal ambiguity and
social contradiction; from a refusal to accept the inescapable nature of vulnerability and a refusal
to be vulnerable to honor their ethical commitments; from an ability to conceptualize and
practice liberal or emancipatory ideas in ways that reinforce domination. To the question of
whether liberalism is a valuable organization of American social and political life, each shows
how it is problematic not because of its denigration of tradition, community and exploitation of
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the working-class323 or its support of a representative democratic system that creates tyrannical
majoritarian rule.324 Each instead demonstrates how the problem comes from liberalism’s ability
to provide the intellectual resources for domination but also the resources to deny or blind
citizens to this process; how liberalism’s championing of the individual could be
counterproductive for the larger goal of equality for all; how liberalism’s moral force could
become chiefly responsible for its most debilitating exclusionary effects. Relatedly, to the
question of the value of individualism in American life, each provides in a critique that goes
beyond individualism’s problematic promotion of ruthless self-interest.325 Each instead
centralized how its debilitating effects came from its radical promise of self-mastery, a promise
so important for managing one’s precarious existence. Yet each also shows how this wish needed
to be renounced for the sake of responsibility because ethics means giving one’s sovereignty
over to others‘ needs, even if this renunciation challenges the rationalism and means-ends logic
of politics. To the question of whether progress towards greater freedom, opportunity,
democracy and equality was inevitable, Baldwin, Ellison and Morison show why it wasn’t.
However, they also challenge the idea of progress not because it is invalidated by the empirical
fact of slavery or other forms of historical oppression but because of constitutive, even if all-too
human, frailty, weakness and fear. Each shows how progress would always be uncertain and
tenuous not because of imperfect political institutions but because of imperfect subjects. Even if
political elites could orchestrate policies that would enable more socioeconomic and political
participation for all, individuals in everyday life would continue rejecting the burden of modeling
an egalitarian existence in their beliefs and practices, would be plagued by insecurity and anxiety
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and would refuse to take on the risk, courage, and sacrifice necessary for this. To the question of
what role should love have in American politics,326 each dramatizes its fundamental importance
for and tension with justice and politics. For each, love’s political value comes not simply from
its exceeding the bounds of narrow liberal-democratic civic-mindedness, as an abstract
commitment to the rule of law, respect for or detached solidarity with fellows citizens. It comes
instead from its promotion of interpersonal care, compassion and concern for concrete others.
Each also shows how this value is also what accounts for love’s incommensurable tension with
the collective and impartial objective as well as the instrumentalism of politics. For them, it is
precisely this tension that needs acknowledgment, acceptance and preservation. Finally, to the
question of what constitutes American radicalism, their work exemplifies a radical critique and
reconstruction of core American values distinct from the political radicalism of American
abolitionism, anarchism, communism, Black Nationalism or feminism.
This contribution to American political thought also extends to larger debates within
political theory. For theorists debating the politics of recognition, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison
goes beyond arguing for the importance of acknowledging culturally different perspectives,
experiences or identities or supplementing this acknowledgment with socioeconomic
redistribution.327 Instead, their work dramatizes why recognition itself required citizens’
presumption of critical respect, mutual reciprocity and generous listening towards others; that it
requires the awareness that one could always fail to grasp others’ multi-varied, sometimes
radically different, experiences. For those theorists concerned with the politics of identity and
326

For this argument central to Puritan political thought see 326 John Withrop, “A Modell of Christian Charity,” in
ed. Theodor Lowi and Isaac Kramnick, American Political Thought: An Anthology (New York: Norton, 2008), 12.
Also see the idea of agape in Martin Luther King Jr., “An Experiment in Love” in A Testament of Hope: The
Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James M. Washington (New York: Harper Collins,
1986), 16-21.
327
Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, Recognition or Redistribution? A Political-Philosophical Debate (New York:
Verso, 2004); Patchen Markell, Bound By Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

117

transformative, emancipatory politics, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison show why emancipation
requires the marginalized to neither wed themselves to wounded identities nor simply disavow
the histories that make these identities wounded.328 Each demonstrates why emancipation
requires marginalized citizens to recognize that real obstacles for flourishing come from a unique
history that thwarts the possibility for unconstrained political agency but also from their own
perceptions and actions. For thinkers concerned with the politics of memory, each illuminates
that the core issue for transformative politics is not simply whether citizens remember how the
past shaped the present329 or whether they renounce this past for strategic coalitions and political
strategy oriented towards the future.330 Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison thus follow Hannah
Arendt’s insights about memory, that the way in which the past is remembered and narrated
helps disrupt conventional understandings of what the present means and what political
possibilities it allows for.331 For those theorists concerned with genre and politics,332 Baldwin,
Ellison and Morrison illustrate not only that narrative is a powerful source for thought and action
but that the non-romantic genres of irony, comedy and tragedy also accomplish political work.
Rather than simply critique the genre of romance for its triumphalism, celebration of
invulnerable heroes and wish for reconciliation, each illuminates that there is something
politically productive about these non-romantic genres because they stress contradiction,
ambiguity and dissonance.
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Yet what is arguably the most unique contribution they make is to contemporary
democratic theory debates about the kind of communicative ethics are most serviceable for
democracy. Deliberative democrats have argued for the importance of aspiring to dialectical
communication that focuses on reciprocity, respect and tolerance as the mode through which to
reach the most reasonable deliberative outcomes. For them, democracy requires a collective that
deliberates freely and exchanges morally defensible public reasons without the sacrifice of equal
respect and the reality of disagreement.333 Agonistic democrats maintain skepticism over this as
both a realistic possibility and ideal because it polices the boundaries of acceptable discourse and
embraces the ideal of agreement.334 For them, deliberative democrats’ commitment to reasoned
conversation leaves little room for emotional or rhetorical discourse, their commitment to
universality marginalized the role of complex, multidimensional lived experience especially of
the oppressed and their commitment to reasonable outcomes encourages the misguided belief
that democratic communication can be settled rather than ongoing, turbulent and unending.
Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison not only resist categorization as deliberativists or agonists but
they theorize core dynamics about democracy overlooked by both camps. Their work shows how
a core threat to democracy is not simply a failure to engage in undistorted communication or the
wish for its closure but the failure of citizens to acknowledge their own unexamined,
unreconstructed personal beliefs and limitations. A core problem in need of address for
successful democratic communication is subjects’ recognition of their own lack of transparency,
their inability to see their own latent wish for power and emotional and social unease. Vigilance
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about this is a crucial step for keeping democracy vibrant, dynamic and open to continual
expansion.
Third, notwithstanding their contribution to contemporary theoretical debates, it is also
illuminating to read their work in light of the contemporary racial moment. At the level of
thinking through the contemporary American discourse’s assumption that we live in a “postracial” society, Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison did not criticize the idea that race no longer
allocates power, shape public attitudes and collective decision-making. They also did not offer a
strong position on whether post-racialism was itself ontological possible or desirable. What they
provide instead are tools for showing why the very possibility of racial equality depends not on
changing attitudes about race or even equal opportunities for African Americans but on a
revision of beliefs that inform everyday citizenship. Failure of citizens to practice critical respect,
assume a shared condition of vulnerability, work in concert and risk themselves to extend
freedom and equality would continue to make post-racialism nothing more than a fantasy. This
can help explain why Barack Obama’s recent ascendance to the American presidency is
inadequate for racial justice. As the first African American President, Obama himself represents
an obvious shift in white Americans’ public attitudes about race and improved opportunities for
African American elites to attain positions of political power, something unforeseeable a halfcentury ago. Yet just because African American elites can better shape political outcomes at the
federal or state levels does not make them telling barometers for real structural change. This is
not because elites are driven by the self-interested goal of reelection or the demands of the
political institutions of which they are part,335 but because their constituents’ everyday attitudes,
modes of being, self and collective perceptions are themselves powerful sources for shaping
racial inequality. Finally, Baldwin’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s work also provides a lens through
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which to think about how the changing nature of American demographics can shape racial
equality. Over the past few decades, the growing number of Latinos has threatened to challenge
the white American electorate’s power and complicate the meaning and durability of the whiteblack binary. As a sizable voting block for national elections and marginalized minority whose
political interests closely align with African Americans, Latinos themselves can have a powerful
role in shaping African American lives. Yet that Latinos, like earlier generations of non-black
ethnics, are decidedly neither black nor Caucasian encourages them to become whiter by
adopting anti-black racism to distance themselves from African Americans.336 Baldwin, Ellison
and Morrison do not theorize this particular process or whether Latinos can create successful
political coalitions with African Americans. Instead, they provide a lens through which to
examine the ways in which Latinos’ wish for Americanization through an embrace of core
political cultural beliefs about freedom, democracy and generosity might inadvertently shape
African American equality.
Their work’s contribution to theorizing the contemporary racial moment also extends to
theorizing contemporary black politics. One central question of black politics is whether black
political leadership should be organized around black elites or the black masses.337 Baldwin,
Ellison and Morrison do not provide a direct answer to this question but show how the success of
black leadership to achieve racial justice depends on a critical self-awareness and respect for
others. Those who lead must be attentive to their own vulnerability to be blinded and seduced by
the belief in complete autonomy and self-sovereignty. They must also see others, despite their
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differences in status and identity standpoints, as being fundamentally equal in terms of their
capacity to be vulnerable and to exercise political and moral agency. Another question of black
politics to which Baldwin, Ellison and Morrison provide insight is whether the subject of black
politics should be shared, pragmatic interests or shared black identity.338 Whatever the basis or
substance of these interests, each shows that the political reforms advocated through black
politics need to espouse a principle of unconditional care for all black citizens irrespective of
class, gender and sexual differences and ensure that such reform is flexible and ongoing rather
than static or temporary.
All these political-theoretical insights raise a larger normative question of whether
American citizens’ revised cultural understandings are alone sufficient for contesting real
structures of racial inequality. To directly tackle this question requires engaging the obvious
criticism that citizens’ revision of dominant cultural understandings is insufficient because
political transformation depends on collective power, which comes from real-world strategy,
strategic coalitions, social movements and public policy reforms. This is an undeniable truth, as
change depends on power. But such an argument reifies our understanding of these various
elements. For example, strategy, coalitions and reforms are not abstract things but are determined
and enacted by real citizens whose worldview is governed by concrete political values, ideas and
understandings of freedom, equality, justice, subjectivity, agency and community. To ignore this
prior but nonetheless crucial ideational aspect of decision-making and action is to miss an
important site of politics. At the same time, the question of Baldwin’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s
work’s transformative political value extends to a question of its global reach. Even if we assume
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that it is valuable for thinking about American racial inequality, can its insights extend beyond
the national frame? Does not a revision of dominant cultural understandings of freedom,
democracy and generosity as a source of political transformation already assume a political
culture in which these values resonate? What of non-liberal societies where this language is
marginal or nonexistent? Does this mean that their work is only valuable for American society
or societies similar to it? If we assess their work from the perspective of whether it can motivate
large-scale transformation and political mobilization, then the answer might be yes. Reformist
movements in nations where the currency of ideas like freedom, democratic commitment and
generosity carry little weight might have trouble mobilizing citizens to act on them. On the other
hand, if we assess their work for its theoretical meditation on these political ideas, independent
of their cultural resonance, then the answer is no. Their rich insights about how political ideas
can shape everyday life as well as one’s interactions provide important diagnostic and normative
insight into thinking about citizenship, obligation and ethical action more generally.
Fourth, this dissertation offers important methodological tools for future studies. On one
level, it can enrich thinking about American political culture theoretically. Historical studies of
American political culture largely debate the question of whether American political culture is
liberal,339civic republican340 or ascriptive.341 These studies seek to explain the nature of
American politics and discourse so as to better understands it contours and charts its future
development. But what remains inadequately unexplored is the theoretical implications of
American cultural beliefs themselves: for example, what is it about the ideal of freedom that is
individually debilitating and that which encourages hostility towards community interests? What
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is it about democracy that makes it a subject of deep attachment but also of anxiety? What is it
about certain understandings of generosity that blind citizens to their own debilitating
implications? First, answering these conceptual questions deepens understanding of how ideas
shape agency, responsibility and political possibility. Second, grasping this also provides a
deeper understanding of why certain configurations of American political culture might be so
durable, persistent and entrenched. Third, it creates the imaginative-intellectual space for
rethinking these values anew.
Relatedly, this dissertation provides a framework for studies of African American
intellectual life. I have restricted my consideration from the immediate postwar period through
the early 1990s but a similar method could be used to explore how 19th and early 20th century
African American intellectuals revised American culture for an emancipatory politics. For
example, how thinkers like Frederick Douglass engaged and revised the cultural understanding
of freedom by dramatizing its deprival, hope for and ultimate experience of ex-slaves;342 how Ida
B. Wells engaged and revised Americans’ understanding of the state’s securing and protecting all
citizens’ lives with a description of the horrors of lynching343; how W.E.B. Du Bois engaged and
revised Americans’ understanding of exemplary citizenship through narratives of the African
Americans’ struggle for and exemplification of democratic values during Reconstruction.344
Examining these thinkers in this way would deepen understanding of their political thought and
our understanding of African American intellectual life throughout history. In a different way,
this dissertation provides methodological tools useful for literary critics studying African
American literature. Literary critics have concerned themselves with whether there is a distinct
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black aesthetics or set of intellectual issues central to African American writers.345 This
dissertation shows how to read literature politically. To glean the insights literature has for real
world citizenship rather than simply conceptualize how it responds to certain real-world political
developments; to better understand its diagnosis of the possibilities and limits of political
contestation rather than it as a reflection of a politics of authorship through authorial language,
plot and character development. Finally, grasping these political insights could itself deepen
understanding of African American literature’s literary devices of genre, metaphor,
personification and trope and its concern with larger issues not explicitly concerned with race.
In the final analysis, this dissertation’s consideration of African American intellectuals’
theorization of justice reflects my own value judgment that power is not all encompassing, that
change is possible and that a better future is within reach. There is good reason to be skeptical of
this aspiration for justice because it can be seen as incapable of contending with the force of state
and capitalist power, is dependent upon citizens’ willpower and implies what is arguably a
modest call for fairness, equality, freedom and participation rather than a revolutionary abolition
of private property or the state. Yet such skepticism about taking justice seriously rests on an
idealized reading of the transformative potential of skepticism itself and models an exclusionary
ethos threatening to any emancipatory politics. There is no reason that theorizing justice cannot
coexist with, complement and enrich a radical critique of power or a revolutionary political
program. The tradition of thinking about justice I have examined is imperfect and open to
critique but my aspiration is that it be read generously as something carrying political value and
transformative potential.
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